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Lawyer as Soothsayer: Exploring the 
Important Role of Outcome Prediction in the 
Practice of Law 
Mark K. Osbeck* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Outcome prediction has always been an important part of practicing 
law. Clients rely heavily on their attorneys to provide accurate 
assessments of the potential legal consequences they face when making 
important decisions (such as whether to accept a plea bargain, or risk a 
conviction on a much more serious offense at trial). And yet, 
notwithstanding its enormous importance to the practice of law (and 
notwithstanding the handsome legal fees it commands), outcome 
prediction in the law remains a very imprecise endeavor. 
The reason for this inaccuracy is that the three principal tools 
lawyers have traditionally relied on to facilitate outcome predictions—
legal analysis, lawyerly experience, and the use of certain types of 
empirical information (e.g., jury verdict reporters)—are all subject to 
significant problems and limitations. This article examines in detail the 
reasons for these problems and limitations, concluding that they are 
essentially intractable. Thus, there is little hope that the traditional tools 
of outcome prediction on their own can ever enable consistently accurate 
assessments of potential legal outcomes. 
Fortunately, however, recent advances in data science offer some 
grounds for optimism. Already, these advances are beginning to alter the 
way law firms operate, and there are good reasons to believe that data 
science (or more specifically, predictive analytics) will soon enable more 
accurate outcome predictions as well. Of course, predictive analytics is 
not a panacea: significant challenges remain if it is going to enable 
accurate outcome predictions on its own. And so it is doubtful that 
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predictive analytics will supplant the traditional tools of outcome 
prediction in the foreseeable future. Rather, predictive analytics is likely 
to complement the traditional tools in order to power more accurate 
outcome predictions. However, even that modest change is likely to have 
a significant effect on the way lawyers practice law, and it should also 
come as very welcome news to their clients.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The practice of law requires lawyers to assume various roles.1 The 
most celebrated of these roles is lawyer as advocate: where is, the lawyer 
stands in the client’s stead, promoting the client’s interests.2 Less 
celebrated, but equally important, is the role of the lawyer as advisor.3 In 
this role, “a lawyer serving as adviser primarily assists his client in 
determining the course of future conduct and relationships.”4 One of the 
most important tasks lawyers undertake in furtherance of this advisory 
role is outcome prediction: that is, advising the client as to the likely 
outcome of various legal proceedings.5 In undertaking this vital task, the 
lawyer is required to analyze the various options and advise the client 
regarding the likely outcome of each so that the client can make an 
informed decision.6 
Outcome prediction, therefore, is an essential lawyering skill. 
Lawyers, particularly litigators, cannot provide effective counsel to 
clients if they cannot accurately assess the potential outcomes of 
 
 1. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980) 
(“In fulfilling his professional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles 
that require the performance of many difficult tasks.”). 
 2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rs. 3.1–3.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(discussing professional responsibilities attendant to the lawyer’s role as advocate). 
 3. Id. at rs. 2.1–2.4 (discussing professional responsibilities attendant to the 
lawyer’s role as advisor). See also KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 17 (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2008) (noting that when acting as business counsel, “the lawyer is 
interested . . . in anticipating what the court might do and in shaping his client’s conduct 
to his client’s desires in view of that anticipation.”). 
 4. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3. 
 5. Id. at EC 7-5 (“A lawyer as adviser furthers the interest of his client by giving 
his professional opinion as to what he believes would likely be the ultimate decision of 
the courts on the matter at hand and by informing his client of the practical effect of such 
decision.”). 
 6. Id. at EC 7-8 (“A lawyer should advise his client of the possible effect of each 
legal alternative.”). 
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litigation and other legal matters and advise their clients accordingly.7 
Outcome prediction is basically the legal equivalent of prognosis in 
medicine: an attempt to forecast the consequences of various courses of 
action so that the lawyer can help the client make informed decisions 
about matters of significant consequence to the client. It pervades the 
practice of law,8 just as it does the practice of medicine. Every time a 
criminal defense attorney advises a client whether to accept a plea 
agreement; every time a civil litigator advises a prospective plaintiff 
whether to initiate a lawsuit, or to settle a lawsuit; every time a tax 
lawyer advises a client whether to take an aggressive deduction on the 
client’s return—in all of these circumstances and many more, the lawyer 
is called upon to serve as a prognosticator as part of the lawyer’s role as 
advisor. 
Yet in spite of the enormous importance of outcome prediction to 
the practice of law, the academic legal literature is lacking any 
thoroughgoing analysis of how outcome prediction in the law actually 
works, and how it might be improved upon.9 What literature there is 
concerning outcome prediction in the law has mainly been generated by 
scholars in cognate disciplines, such as artificial intelligence and political 
science, and it is primarily concerned with generating predictive 
models.10 What remains wanting is a thorough understanding of the 
actual tools lawyers use to formulate outcome predictions and a critical 
assessment of their effectiveness. 
 
 7. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 
(1897) (arguing that law is a profession precisely because people are willing to pay 
lawyers to advocate on their behalf and to advise them as to possible legal consequences 
they may face). 
 8. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-5. 
 9. This lack of attention in the literature may well be because, to put it simply, 
predictions are difficult, and lawyers have traditionally been less than stellar at making 
outcome predictions. See NANCY L. SCHULTZ & LOUIS J. SIRICO, JR., LEGAL WRITING AND 
OTHER LAWYERING SKILLS 184 (6th ed. 2014) (“[T]rying to predict what parties, 
witnesses, judges, and juries are likely to do is often little more than an educated guessing 
game.”); see also infra Part IV. 
 10. See, e.g., Lee Loevinger, Jurimetrics: The Next Step Forward, 33 MINN. L. REV. 
455 (1949); Fred Kort, Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A 
Quantitative Analysis of the “Right to Counsel” Cases, 51 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (1957); 
Glendon Schubert, A Psychometric Model of the Supreme Court, AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST, 
Nov. 1961, at 14; Franklin M. Fisher, The Mathematical Analysis of Supreme Court 
Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Quantitative Methods, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321 
(1958). 
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This Article attempts to fill the void in the legal academic literature 
concerning outcome prediction. It does so by first examining how 
outcome prediction has traditionally functioned in the practice of law, 
whereby lawyers have relied on three principal tools: (1) legal analysis 
(of a particular sort this article refers to as “element-focused analysis”); 
(2) lawyerly experience; and (3) the use of certain types of empirical 
information.11 The Article then evaluates critically the effectiveness of 
these traditional tools, focusing on a variety of issues that impede 
accurate predictions.12 The Article gives particular attention to problems 
that inherently afflict the “element-focused analysis” that lawyers have 
long relied upon to inform outcome predictions, as this topic has received 
almost no attention in the scholarly literature.13 Lastly, the Article 
discusses how outcome prediction in the practice of law might be 
improved upon going forward, thanks to recent advances in data 
science.14 It concludes that while the traditional tools that lawyers use to 
make outcome predictions (particularly the element-focused analysis) 
have a number of shortcomings that lead to significant inaccuracy, the 
new tools that rely upon predictive analytics offer a glimmer of hope that 
lawyers going forward will be better at making outcome predictions than 
they traditionally have been.15 
Part II of this Article discusses in detail the reasons why outcome 
prediction is a vital part of practicing law. Part III looks at the tools 
lawyers have traditionally used to make outcome predictions. It examines 
in detail each of the three principal tools and the ways in which lawyers 
use them in practice. Part IV examines the problems and limitations that 
afflict the traditional tools of outcome prediction, again with a particular 
focus on the element-focused analysis that has traditionally played a vital 
role in outcome prediction, but which is largely ignored in the literature. 
And finally, Part V of this Article discusses the prospects going forward 
for employing predictive analytics to help lawyers make more accurate 
outcome predictions. 
 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. See infra Part IV. 
 13. See infra Section IV.A. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. See infra Part VI.  
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II. THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTCOME PREDICTION TO THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW 
The legal profession is not unique in its need for accurate outcome 
predictions. In a number of professional fields, practitioners need to be 
able to assess the likelihood of potential outcomes. In the field of 
medicine, for example, doctors need to make prognoses to properly 
assess treatment options; in the field of investment advising, 
stockbrokers strive to provide their clients an accurate assessment of a 
stock’s likely prospects in the market; and in the field of sports, 
prognosticators are valued not only for the assistance they can provide 
gamblers but also for such things as evaluating the potential success of 
prospective players. 
In the practice of law, lawyers need to assess the likely outcome of 
litigation matters for several important reasons. First, the decision 
whether to originate a litigation matter requires a reasonable balancing of 
costs versus expected benefits, and a significant component of this 
calculation is an estimation of the client’s likelihood of success. Second, 
deciding whether to accept a settlement offer, whether in the criminal or 
civil context, depends upon a reasonable assessment of the likely 
outcome in the absence of a settlement. And third, outside of a litigation 
context, transactional lawyers often need to assess the likely outcomes of 
the various decisions confronting their business clients (for example, the 
prospects of litigation arising from a proposed business decision), and 
this too requires a reasonable prediction as to what is likely to happen if 
the client proceeds in a certain manner. For each of these reasons, as well 
as some other more minor reasons, outcome prediction forms an 
important part of a lawyer’s role when the lawyer acts as an advisor 
rather than an advocate.16 
A. The Importance of Outcome Prediction in Case Selection 
First, outcome prediction is vital to efficient case selection. When a 
civil litigator or prosecutor is evaluating whether to initiate an action, the 
 
 16. See Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction – Or – How I Learned to 
Stop Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services 
Industry, 62 EMORY L.J. 909, 912 (2013) (“[P]rediction is a core component of the 
guidance that many lawyers offer. Indeed, it is by generating informed answers to these 
types of questions that many lawyers earn their respective wages.”). 
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lawyer needs to first assess the merits of the prospective case,17 which in 
turn requires the lawyer to evaluate the likelihood of success.18 
The lawyer has an ethical obligation not to pursue a spurious 
action19 (or, in the case of a prosecutor, to refrain from prosecuting an 
action the lawyer knows is unsupported by probable cause20), and this 
requires an assessment as to the likelihood of winning. If there is little or 
no chance of success, then the lawyer needs to evaluate the lawyer’s 
ethical obligations carefully. 
However, even assuming these ethical obligations are satisfied, the 
lawyer must still make an outcome prediction to properly assess the case. 
First, the lawyer has a fiduciary obligation to act in accordance with the 
client’s interests,21 and this requires (among other things) a risk-benefit 
analysis balancing the costs of litigation against the possible recovery.22 
Second, from the perspective of the lawyer’s own pecuniary 
interests, outcome prediction is often important in determining whether 
the action is worth pursuing from the point of view of the lawyer or the 
lawyer’s firm, particularly in contingency citations, when the lawyer has 
a stake in the litigation.23 If, for example, a plaintiff’s lawyer 
overestimates either the likelihood of success or the likely amount of the 
recovery, the client is not going to be happy with the result because the 
recovery is less than expected, and the lawyer’s law firm will also be 
unhappy, if the firm has a contingent interest in the litigation and the 
ultimate recovery does not justify the firm’s expenditure on the matter. 
 
 17. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Kline, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984); see also THOMAS A. MAUET & DAVID MARCUS, PRETRIAL 
86–91 (9th ed. 2015). 
 18. See Edie Greene & Brian H. Bornstein, Cloudy Forecasts, TRIAL, Apr. 2011, at 
28, 29 (“When evaluating a case’s potential, the lawyer weighs the costs and benefits 
based upon an educated guess as to the case’s outcome.”). 
 19. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).  
 20. Id. at r. 3.8. 
 21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§ 49–50 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2000).   
 22. See Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big 
Data, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1337, 1370–71 (2015) (describing research indicating that lawyers 
undertake this type of analysis in assessing the validity of prospective actions); see also 
Greene & Bornstein, supra note 18, at 29. 
 23. In a contingency action, the plaintiff’s lawyer’s fee is dependent on the recovery. 
Typically, such lawyers get a percentage of the final recovery (capped by state rules), 
with the percentage amount depending on whether and when the matter is settled, or 
whether it proceeds to trial and/or appeal. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 97–
99. 
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Likewise, if a prosecutor overestimates the likelihood of success on a 
criminal action, this increases the risk of an acquittal that might 
otherwise have resulted in a plea bargain. And even if a plea is ultimately 
entered, the costs required to obtain that plea will likely exceed what 
they would have been had the prosecution made a more reasonable offer 
early in the litigation process. 
Thus, in both the civil and criminal contexts, outcome prediction is 
an important part of the initial case assessment that takes place before an 
action is originated. 
B. The Importance of Outcome Prediction in Making Settlement 
Decisions 
Outcome prediction is perhaps even more important in the context 
of settlement negotiations, given that a critical component of rational 
negotiation is a reasonable assessment of the likely outcome of the case 
in the absence of a negotiated settlement agreement.24 Imagine, for 
example, that you come home from work one night and waiting for you 
in the shadows are several police officers. They arrest you, charge you 
with a crime, and cart you off to jail. Hopefully, you are able to obtain 
bail and gain your release. And now it’s time to begin working on your 
defense. At that point, you earnestly want a lawyer to assist you. 
So, what would you look for in that lawyer? You might be inclined 
to look for a Perry Mason type—a brilliant trial lawyer who could prove 
your innocence at trial.25 However, that may not be your wisest option. 
For in the vast majority of both criminal and civil cases, the outcome is 
determined not through jury trials, but rather through negotiation and 
plea bargaining.26 And so you would probably be better served by 
 
 24. See George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and 
Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEG. STUD. 135, 136–37 (1993) (describing the generally 
accepted model of settlement, whereby cases that fail to settle are those in which the 
plaintiff overstates and/or the defendant underestimates the expected value of going to 
trial). 
 25. Perry Mason is a fictional American trial lawyer. He was the main character in 
numerous novels written by Erle Gardner. The character was also portrayed by actor 
Raymond Burr in a popular television series that originally ran from 1957–1966. See 
Perry Mason, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, www.britannica.com/topic/Perry-Mason (last 
visited July 30, 2018). 
 26. Laura A. Kaster, Cognitive Barriers to Valuing Your Case for Settlement or 
Mediation: Improving Your Risk Assessment, 269 N.J. LAW. 43, 43 (noting that “[o]ver 
95% of litigated cases are settled.”). 
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focusing on a lawyer who was skilled at negotiation and at providing you 
with sage advice as to the desirability of accepting whatever plea bargain 
that the prosecution may ultimately offer.27 
In order to provide such counsel, your lawyer will have to properly 
assess your case, which involves a risk-benefit analysis. Specifically, 
your lawyer must balance the prospect of a sure adverse result (e.g., a 
one-year prison term) against a potentially worse adverse result (e.g., a 
20-year prison term), if your defense fails at trial, and you are 
convicted.28 And that, in turn, requires your lawyer to forecast both the 
likelihood of losing at trial, should you reject the prosecutor’s plea 
bargain, and the length of the sentence you are likely to receive if you are 
convicted at trial.29 
Reasonable outcome prediction is also essential to making wise 
decisions regarding settlement prospects in the civil context. In order to 
provide sage counsel as to the desirability of accepting any given 
settlement offer, a lawyer must be able to properly assess the odds of 
winning at trial and the potential ramifications of losing at trial.30 
Suppose, for example, that the lawyer is defending a company in a 
breach of contract action. The plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in damages for 
the breach, and the defendant has made an offer of $100,000. In that 
situation, whether the $100,000 settlement offer is reasonable (from the 
defendant’s perspective) depends, at least as a starting point, upon the 
likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict, the likely amount of any verdict, and 
the anticipated costs (primarily attorney’s fees) of proceeding to trial.31 
 
 27. These two skills, however, are interrelated. A lawyer with a widespread 
reputation for strong trial skills is likely to have an advantage in terms of settlement clout 
over a less skilled trial lawyer because opposing counsel will be less inclined to take their 
chances at trial against a skilled trial lawyer. 
 28. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 2463, 2496–527 (2004). 
 29. See Holmes, supra note 7, at 457 (“People want to know under what 
circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is so much 
stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find out when this danger is 
to be feared. The object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the incidence of 
the public force through the instrumentality of the courts.”). 
 30. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968, 997 (1979); see also Stevenson & 
Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1375–77. 
 31. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and 
Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); William M. Landes, An Economic 
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J. L. & ECON. 61 (1971); see also Mnookin & Kornhausert, 
supra note 30, at 968. 
OSBECK- FINAL EDITED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2018  4:54 PM 
50 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1 
 
 
 
 
The more inaccurate the defendant’s assessment of the case, the more 
money the defendant is likely to lose, either by paying too much in the 
settlement, or by taking an unjustified risk at trial.32 And the same is true 
of the plaintiff. The more inaccurate the plaintiff’s assessment, the less 
the plaintiff is likely to recover, either by accepting too little in the 
settlement, or by taking an unjustified risk at trial.33 So accurate outcome 
prediction is essential to a lawyer’s ability to provide sound advice to the 
client regarding settlement prospects. 
Furthermore, the ability of lawyers to effectively advise clients as to 
the likely outcome of litigation matters affects more than just individual 
clients. For unless both lawyers in a litigation matter properly assess the 
likelihood of a particular outcome, the efficiency of the settlement 
process itself suffers. Presumably, the goal of settlement is to avoid 
 
 32. In mathematical terms, the settlement offer (“S”) is reasonable from the 
defendant’s perspective if: S ≤ (P × V) + C (where “P” is the probability of a plaintiff’s 
verdict, “V” is the likely size of the verdict, and “C” is the cost of proceeding to trial). 
Thus, if the defense lawyer estimates the probability of a plaintiff’s verdict (P) at 15%, 
the potential verdict amount (V) at $1 million, and the costs of additional litigation to trial 
(C) at $25,000, then the $100,000 settlement amount is reasonable, given that the value of 
(P × V) + C is $175,000 in that hypothetical. Conversely, if the plaintiff refuses to settle 
the case for $175,000, then it would be prudent for the defendant to take its chances at 
trial, assuming it isn’t risk averse for some other rational reason (e.g., the company is 
uninsured and would be bankrupted by a $1 million verdict, but could absorb some lesser 
amount, such as $200,000). See generally Priest & Kline, supra note 17, at 12–13; 
MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 408–13 (discussing in depth this type of settlement 
calculation). This formula is overly simplified, of course. There are other potential costs, 
such as tax consequences, bad publicity, etc., that must be factored into the equation as 
well. Furthermore, it may sometimes be reasonable for a defendant (or its insurer) to offer 
less in settlement than the formula would indicate is reasonable, in hopes of deterring 
future litigation. On the simple formula set out above, even if the likelihood of a 
successful recovery is zero (because P is zero), it would still be rational for the defendant 
to settle for an amount greater than zero but less than the cost of going to trial, which is 
generally not insignificant. But if the defendant settles right away for nuisance value, as 
the simple formula would prescribe, there is little to prevent unscrupulous plaintiffs from 
filing frivolous lawsuits in hopes of scoring a quick settlement. The defendant has an 
incentive to require the plaintiff to prove up its case, which helps to eliminate spurious 
cases, and also requires the plaintiff to incur costs that would serve as a deterrent to filing 
a lawsuit. The formula is also overly simplified with respect to determining the expected 
value of V, the potential verdict. While this amount might be fairly definite in some types 
of actions, such as breach of contract actions in which plaintiffs seeks a set amount, in 
other types of actions, such as negligence actions, estimating the potential recovery is 
more difficult. In those types of actions, there will a range of potential verdicts (e.g., the 
defense lawyer may reasonably assess the expected verdict at anywhere from $100,000 to 
$1 million). See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 408–09. 
 33. See Charles J. Snyder, Moneyball Lawyering, 65 ARK. L. REV. 837, 854 (2012). 
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uncertainty and wasted resources (in addition to mental stress) by short-
circuiting the litigation process, so that roughly the same result is reached 
in settlement that would have been reached at trial, without the negatives 
of protracted litigation.34 However, if either or both lawyers have 
unrealistic expectations of their client’s likelihood of success at trial, 
then an efficient settlement won’t be reached.35 If, for example, the 
plaintiff’s lawyer overestimates the likelihood of success, then some 
cases that shouldn’t proceed to trial will; conversely, if the plaintiff’s 
lawyer underestimates the likelihood of success and decides not to 
pursue a meritorious action vigorously, then some deserving plaintiffs 
will settle for less than fair compensation.36 
Thus, the ability to make reasonably accurate predictions regarding 
litigation outcomes is key to the efficiency of our litigation system as a 
whole. And the same is true with respect to the efficiency of our criminal 
justice system. If prosecutors make errant judgments about the likely 
result of potential prosecutions, then the system will misallocate judicial 
and prosecutorial resources, resulting in fewer convictions of those who 
deserve to be convicted, and a greater waste of time and resources trying 
to convict those who merit lesser plea bargains. 
C. The Importance of Outcome Prediction in Transactional Practice 
While outcome prediction is most clearly at issue in litigation 
matters, the importance of outcome prediction is not confined to 
litigation. Transactional lawyers also need to assess potential outcomes 
to properly counsel their clients. A tax attorney advising a client whether 
to take a certain deduction, for example, must analyze both the likelihood 
 
 34. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 393 (“The law encourages settlement, 
and clients often prefer settlement over the increased expenses and uncertainties of a 
trial.”).   
 35. See Jane Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to 
Predict Case Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 134 (2010) (“At the end of 
the day, it is the accurate predictions of the lawyer that enable the justice system to 
function smoothly . . . .”). A similar cost/benefit analysis is required for efficient 
litigation strategy. To decide whether a particular motion is warranted, for example, or 
whether it is worthwhile to pursue a certain type of evidence in support of a claim or 
defense, requires a balancing of the costs versus the anticipated likelihood of success. See 
Snyder, supra note 33, at 854.  
 36. Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 35, at 134–35; Kaster, supra note 26, at 
43, 46. 
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of an audit as well as the likely outcome should the IRS decide to pursue 
an audit. 
Often, potential litigation is an important contingency that 
individuals and companies have to consider when they enter into 
business transactions. If there is a possibility that the contemplated 
transaction will involve litigation, then both the potential consequences 
of that litigation and the expected costs of that litigation must be factored 
into the cost-benefit analysis as the client determines whether to go 
forward with the deal. And in order to properly assess the costs and 
benefits of the prospective transaction, the transactional lawyer (often in 
conjunction with a litigator) must make a prediction with respect to the 
likely outcome of the potential litigation.37 
Suppose, for example, a group of investors is considering 
purchasing a tract of real estate in order to develop it into a private golf 
and ski resort. The client is interested in investing tens of millions of 
dollars to purchase a large tract of undeveloped land, which the client 
thinks could ultimately be developed into parcels worth several hundred 
million dollars in the aggregate. There is, however, one not-so-little 
hitch: title to the land is in dispute, and that title is the subject of a 
pending lawsuit. Both the client (i.e., the prospective buyer), and the 
seller believe that the seller’s pending quiet-title action is likely to 
succeed, and yet it is crucially important to get a sense of just how likely 
the odds of success are, so that the client can make a rational decision 
whether to invest in the property at all, and if so, how much to invest. 
The difference between a 5 percent likelihood that the quiet title action 
would fail versus a 20 percent likelihood that it would fail will make a 
significant difference in the amount the client is willing to pay for the 
property. In this type of situation, the transactional lawyer’s job is to 
provide (probably in conjunction with firm’s litigation attorneys) the best 
possible outcome prediction as to the quiet title action so that the client 
can make an informed choice whether to proceed with the purchase.38 
The transactional client’s decision whether to proceed with a deal, 
and if so, how much to invest in it, may also hinge on outcome 
 
 37. See Peter A. Antonucci & Lianne S. Pinchuk, The Importance of Product 
Liability Risk Assessment in Business Valuation and Acquisitions, THE METROPOLITAN 
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Sept. 13, 2017, at 1 (arguing that transactional lawyers should 
enlist experienced litigators in assessing product liability risks in connection with 
business valuations and acquisitions). 
 38. See id. 
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predictions regarding other types of proceedings, such as the prospects 
for proposed legislation or regulatory action.39 For example, a company’s 
decision whether to build a new plant in a particular location may hinge 
in large part on a proposed regulation that affects potential liability for 
environmental concerns. In that instance, the transactional lawyer may 
turn to the firm’s regulatory lawyers for guidance as to the likely 
prospects for agency approval. 
There are other contingencies transactional lawyers need to consider 
as well. They need to make predictions as to uncertainties, such as 
whether necessary licenses and permits can be obtained, and if so, how 
quickly; whether the U.S. Department of Justice will approve a proposed 
merger; or whether adequate financing will be available to fund the 
transaction. All of these require the transactional lawyer to engage in 
some degree of prognostication.40 
Thus, outcome prediction is a vital component of client counseling. 
The client will have difficulty making important decisions unless the 
client has confidence in the lawyer’s ability to make accurate outcome 
predictions. While this article focuses mostly upon outcome prediction in 
the context of litigation, the importance of outcome prediction is not 
limited to that area of the law, and much of what is discussed below 
applies in the transactional context as well. 
III. THE TRADITIONAL TOOLS OF OUTCOME PREDICTION 
The principal tools lawyers have traditionally used to predict case 
outcomes are: (1) an element-focused analysis of each asserted cause of 
action and defense in the case, looking to prior decisional law to 
determine whether these elements are met; (2) lawyerly experience; and 
(3) certain types of empirical information that may provide insight into 
how a prospective judge or jury would decide the instant matter. This 
Part examines the nature of these tools, and Part IV examines their 
shortcomings. 
 
 39. Electronic legal research providers are now providing tools to assist with this 
type of outcome prediction (e.g., the LexisNexis Legislative Outlook tool). See Press 
Release, LexisNexis Debuts Legislative Outlook and Moves Extensive News Archive to 
Lexis Advance, LEXISNEXIS, https://bit.ly/2NYqq2q (last visited July 30, 2018).  
 40. See LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING & ANALYSIS 3–4 (3d ed. 2011). 
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A. The Element-Focused Analysis 
The foundational tool lawyers have traditionally used to assess 
cases, particularly in the early stages of a dispute, is an “element-focused 
analysis” of the causes of action and defenses. In undertaking this type of 
analysis, the lawyer anticipates the process the trier of fact will need to 
follow in its assessment of the claim by analytically breaking down the 
cause of action or defense into its constituent elements, then determining 
for each element whether it applies in light of the known facts in order to 
predict the likely outcome.41 Occasionally, courts will employ other 
types of tests (e.g., a factor test42) in reaching their determinations, but 
the most fundamental type of analysis in judicial decision-making 
revolves around an analysis of the elements of the various causes-of-
action and defenses. The lawyer then goes through the same process with 
respect to each potential defense. In other words, when assessing the 
viability of a claim or potential claim, the lawyer examines, for each 
cause of action that has or might be alleged, the various elements and 
defenses that are applicable, and then makes a separate assessment as to 
the viability of each such element or defense. The lawyer can then assess 
the likely outcome of the cause of action overall, since (by definition) a 
cause of action fails if any element is not met, or if any (complete) 
defense applies.43 
 
 41. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1342; see also RICHARD K. 
NEUMANN, JR. ET AL., LEGAL REASONING AND LEGAL WRITING 9–16 (8th ed. 2017) 
[hereinafter NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING]. 
 42. In an equitable matter, such as a child custody determination, for example, courts 
balance various factors such as the parents’ employment status, or a parents’ drug/alcohol 
abuse, in deciding what custody arrangement is in the best interests of the child. 
Presumably, however, judicial decisions involving such factor tests are even more 
difficult to predict than those involving element focused analyses, since they involve a 
complicated weighing and a balancing of the various factors to determine whether the 
standard applies, and not just a “checking off” of those requirements that need to be met 
to fall within the scope of a legal rule. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Justices 
of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–59 (1992); Kevin H. Smith, Practical 
Jurisprudence: Deconstructing and Synthesizing the Art and Science of Thinking Like a 
Lawyer, 29 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 58–61 (1998) (discussing how standards operate in legal 
analyses and arguing that legal standards are less constraining than rules). 
 43. See Smith, supra note 42, at 47–57 (discussing how elements operate in applying 
legal rules to facts, and arguing that rules are essentially conditional (i.e., “if/then” 
statements) comprised of triggering conditions in the form of elements); see also 
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1342 (“This application of law to facts would 
yield an estimate about probabilities: that is, a prediction of the likelihood that a given 
rule would govern a given scenario.”). 
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Suppose, for example, that a potential client wants to bring a cause 
of action for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. In 
most states, a cause of action for the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (IIED) requires the plaintiff to establish four elements: 
(1) that the conduct was intentional or reckless, (2) that the behavior in 
question caused the emotional distress, (3) that the defendant’s conduct 
was “outrageous,” and (4) that the resulting emotional distress was 
severe.44 The traditional element-focused analysis proceeds by evaluating 
each of these elements in turn, trying to assess whether, in light of the 
known facts, each one would be deemed applicable, were the court or 
jury to evaluate the potential case. Then, having analyzed each element 
(and any applicable defenses, such as the defense of privilege), the 
lawyer tries to make a projection as to the likelihood of success of the 
cause of action as a whole, based on the likelihood that each component 
element is met. 
In determining whether the elements of a cause of action are met, 
the traditional analysis evaluates each element primarily in light of the 
case precedents interpreting that element. 45 Thus, the traditional analysis 
relies heavily upon legal research to find precedents that can be 
compared and contrasted on their facts with the instant case to determine 
whether the element is met.46 Suppose, for example, that the potential 
defendant in our hypothetical IIED case is a teacher who yelled and 
cursed at the potential plaintiff, who was a 12-year-old student. Does that 
behavior constitute “outrageous conduct” for purposes of establishing the 
third element of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress? To 
answer this question, the lawyer traditionally starts by researching case 
law in the appropriate jurisdiction (or assigning the research to an 
associate), looking for IIED cases that shed light on the meaning of 
“outrageous conduct.”47 
 
 44. Most states follow the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 
1965), which lays out these four elements of the tort. 
 45. The elements themselves may derive either from a textual source (e.g., a statute) 
or from the common law (e.g., a cause of action in tort, such as IIED). See Smith, supra 
note 42, at 49.  
 46. See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576–79 (1987) 
(describing in depth how precedent functions at a theoretical level) [hereinafter Schauer, 
Precedent]; see also Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1371–72.  
 47. Case-law precedents are not the exclusive interpretive tools, however; other 
interpretive aids, such as scholarly commentary, may also be used to shed light on the 
meaning and applicability of the various elements. With respect to IIED, for example, the 
comments and illustrations that accompany RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 are 
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Having located relevant precedents on this issue, the lawyer then 
looks at two things: (1) whether the courts promulgate any rules, factors, 
or principles (explicit or implicit) that outline the boundaries of that 
element (e.g., rules that define “outrageous conduct”); and (2) whether 
the defendant’s behavior in the instant case is similar to the behavior of 
the defendants in those cases in which courts have found the element to 
be met.48 
As regards the first criterion, the law in most states follows the 
Restatement in requiring a very high threshold for outrageous conduct: it 
must be conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, 
as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”49 The second 
criterion—factual similarity between the precedent case and the instant 
case—is key for fleshing out the applicability of abstract rules, such as 
the one quoted above. If the factual circumstances are sufficiently and 
relevantly similar, then the lawyer concludes that the element of 
outrageous conduct is likely satisfied, and will move on to the next 
element; if the behavior is not on par, then the element is not met.50 Once 
a determination is made with respect to each element, the cause of action 
as a whole can be evaluated because a cause of action exists only if every 
element is established.51 
Of course, the degree of confidence the lawyer has in a particular 
outcome prediction depends upon how confident the lawyer is with 
respect to each element. While lawyers typically don’t assign 
percentages to the individual elements (e.g., a 60 percent chance the jury 
will find the element of causation is met), they do tend to qualify their 
determinations broadly (e.g., it is “highly likely” or just “more likely 
than not” that the jury will find the conduct to be outrageous).52 And this, 
of course, affects their assessment of the cause of action as a whole. 
Thus, if the lawyer feels that it is highly likely the jury will find each 
 
generally considered important persuasive authorities for interpreting the elements set out 
in the model rule. 
 48. See Smith, supra note 42, at 40–46 (discussing the synthesis of legal rules from 
precedents and their application to facts). 
 49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d. 
 50. See Smith, supra note 42, at 45 (“[T]he doctrine of stare decisis or precedent is 
quite complex, but it can be reasonably captured by a single phrase: similar facts, same 
law, same result.”). 
 51. See NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 121.  
 52. Id. at 164. 
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element of IIED to be met, then the lawyer can be quite confident in 
predicting that a cause of action for IIED will succeed.53 Conversely, if 
the lawyer determines that it is just slightly more likely than not that one 
or more of the elements is met, then the lawyer will make a less 
confident prediction. 
Research memoranda (a.k.a. “legal memoranda” or “formal office 
memoranda”) have traditionally been the vehicles through which lawyers 
record and convey their outcome predictions.54 Further, for many years, 
researching and preparing such memoranda occupied the lion’s share of a 
typical junior attorney’s time.55 Traditionally in these memoranda, the 
lawyer started with a question presented and a short answer to the 
question presented. This was followed by a summary of the facts, and 
then a detailed element-by-element analysis of one or more causes of 
action and/or defenses, followed by a brief conclusion that assessed the 
viability of the overall action.56 Some experienced lawyers, however, 
may prefer that the lawyer undertaking a research project confine the 
scope of the memorandum to explaining the legal requirements for each 
individual element or defense, leaving the overall analysis as to the 
viability of the overall cause of action to the senior lawyer. Frequently, 
the research memorandum will then form the basis for an advice letter to 
the client, through which the senior lawyer can convey the results of the 
 
 53. But see infra Section IV.A.6. 
 54. See NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 159 (“An office 
memorandum predicts how the law will treat the client.”); JOHN C. DERNBACH ET AL., A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO LEGAL WRITING & LEGAL METHOD 259–60 (4th ed. 2010); 
EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 131 (“Making an accurate prediction, then, is the function of 
an office memo.”). 
 55. Kirsten K. Davis, “The Reports of My Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated”: 
Reading and Writing Objective Legal Memoranda in a Mobile Computing Age, 92 OR. L. 
REV. 471, 472–74, 482–83 (2013) (summarizing the traditional use of the office 
memorandum and describing a survey of law school graduates and their continued use of 
traditional legal memoranda, as well as more contemporary alternatives, such as short 
email memos). 
 56. RICHARD K. NEUMANN, JR. ET AL., LEGAL WRITING 123–26 (3d ed. 2015). Of 
course, legal memoranda have other possible uses as well. For example, a legal 
memorandum can be used merely to summarize the law on a particular topic, without 
applying that law to the facts in question. Similarly, it can be used to merely make the 
best arguments the clients can make in light of the law and the facts, without necessarily 
trying to predict a likely outcome. However, the main use of a legal memorandum 
traditionally has been to assess the client’s case and to predict the likely outcome. 
NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 159. 
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element-focused analysis to the client, and advise the client 
accordingly.57 
Most often, this analysis takes place at the beginning of the 
litigation process, where the lawyers for the parties are trying to ascertain 
how they should respond to a potential litigation matter (e.g., whether to 
file a claim if they represent the plaintiff, or whether to make an early 
settlement offer if they represent the defendant).58 As discussed in Part II 
above, the plaintiff’s lawyer needs to evaluate the potential amount and 
the likelihood of a potential jury verdict in order to determine whether 
filing the action is justified, and the defendant’s lawyer needs to assess 
the client’s potential exposure in order to evaluate early settlement 
options and in order to set a strategy and budget for case management 
purposes.59 
In recent years, such formal legal memoranda have been used less 
frequently by lawyers, mainly due to the cost of preparing them.60 As 
clients have become more cost-conscious, lawyers have tried to become 
more cost-efficient, relying less on formal memoranda and more on 
shorter, informal memoranda, email memoranda, and oral research 
reports.61 So while it may still make financial sense for a law firm to 
have an associate prepare a traditional office memorandum in a high-
stakes matter, where cost-containment is not a pressing consideration, it 
may not make sense in a more mundane litigation matter. 
Still, regardless of the vehicle through which lawyers convey their 
analyses, the element-focused analysis, based on legal research, has 
formed the backbone of the traditional approach to outcome prediction 
and remains an important predictive tool. It is still one of the principal 
tools lawyers use to assess cases, particularly at the beginning of a 
litigation matter.62 It is also one that can at least partially be delegated to 
 
 57. EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 4, 131; CHARLES R. CALLEROS, LEGAL METHOD & 
WRITING 207, 210–11 (7th ed. 2014); DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 54, at 259. 
 58. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 5–15 (discussing the role of element-
focused analysis in the initial case-evaluation process). 
 59. See supra notes 25–35 and accompanying text. 
 60. See Kristen Konrad Robbins-Tiscione, From Snail Mail to Email: The 
Traditional Legal Memorandum in the Twenty-First Century, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 32, 32–
36 (2008) (describing survey results showing a reduced use of formal legal memoranda in 
the practice of law). 
 61. Id. at 32–36, 41–42.  
 62. NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 40–45 (discussing the 
steps involved in an element-focused analysis and describing it as the principal tool of 
predictive writing). 
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more junior lawyers, as it takes full advantage of the legal research, 
writing, and analysis skills that law students develop in law school.63 
B. Lawyerly Experience 
Another important resource that lawyers rely on when making 
outcome predictions is lawyerly experience. Seasoned lawyers 
instinctively temper the predictive analysis of an associate’s legal 
memorandum with their own experience in assessing the likely outcome 
of cases.64 An experienced plaintiffs’ lawyer, for example, may know 
from past experience that plaintiffs’ verdicts for a cause of action such as 
IIED are relatively uncommon, and the experienced lawyer will temper 
accordingly the tendency of junior lawyers to skew the analysis in favor 
of the client.65 Furthermore, the element-focused analysis contained in a 
typical research memorandum often sheds more light on how likely an 
action is to survive a motion to dismiss or a summary judgment motion, 
rather than the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict at trial. In the case of 
IIED, for example, most of the reported cases are appeals from 
dismissals for failure to state a cause of action or appeals from summary 
judgment orders. Thus, they provide little guidance for how a jury is 
likely to resolve a matter that survives a dispositive motion and proceeds 
to trial. 
An experienced lawyer may also consider other factors, besides the 
doctrinal considerations that are analyzed in a traditional element-
focused analysis, in trying to predict the likely outcome of a litigation 
matter. For example, an experienced lawyer may take into account the 
background and perceived predilections of the individual judge(s) 
involved in the case particularly if the lawyer has personal experiences to 
 
 63. For this reason, learning to draft memoranda is still one of the principal topics 
taught in nearly all first-year legal writing classes, and it occupies an important place in 
nearly all first-year legal writing textbooks. See, e.g., CALLEROS, supra note 57, at 189–
343; DERNBACH ET AL., supra note 54, at 259–91; EDWARDS, supra note 40, at 131–45; 
NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra note 41, at 159–67. 
 64. See CLARENCE MORRIS, HOW LAWYERS THINK 11–19 (2d prtg. 1938) (discussing 
generally a lawyer’s reliance on intuition). 
 65. See Suzanne E. Rowe, Legal Research, Legal Writing, and Legal Analysis: 
Putting Law School Into Practice, 29 STETSON L. REV. 1193, 1198 (discussing the 
tendency of law students to “skew their research or analysis to reach the answer they 
think the supervising attorney or the client wants”); Amanda Smith, Preparing for 
Practice Beyond the Bench: Opinion Writing as the “Heart and Soul” of the First 
Semester of Legal Writing, 18 J. LEG. WRITING INST. 263, 282 (2012) (arguing that most 
inexperienced researchers skew the analysis in favor of the client). 
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draw on with respect to these variables.66 The experienced lawyer may 
also factor in non-doctrinal considerations such as the equities of the 
lawsuit, the sympathetic or not-so-sympathetic nature of the parties, the 
reputation of the opposing counsel, etc.67 
In drawing upon experience to inform outcome prediction, the 
lawyer is not necessarily confined to the lawyer’s own personal 
experience. Rather, the lawyer may draw upon the opinion of more 
seasoned lawyers (or expert consultants), in much the same way that a 
physician may draw upon the experience of more seasoned physicians in 
making a diagnosis.68 In either case, anecdotal evidence tempers the 
purely legal emphasis of the element-focused analysis. 
This anecdotal evidence thus enables the experienced lawyer to take 
a more holistic approach to outcome prediction.69 The lawyer relies not 
just on a legalistic examination of the constituent parts of a particular 
cause of action, but also on a more “gestalt” view of the case (based on 
the lawyer’s intuition) that takes into account a broader range of 
potentially relevant considerations.70 Again, the parallel to medicine 
presents itself. Just as an experienced physician may rely not only on a 
checklist of symptoms in making a diagnosis but also on the physician’s 
intuitive sense regarding the patient’s overall presentation, so too the 
experienced lawyer may rely at least in part on whether the case “feels” 
like a winner, drawing on the lawyer’s experience-based intuitions about 
the strength of the case.71 This may well track (at least in part) the 
manner in which judges and juries reach decisions.72 There is significant 
 
 66. See Daniel M. Schneider, Assessing and Predicting Who Wins Federal Tax Trial 
Decisions, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473, 509–14 (2002) (arguing that a judge’s 
background traits, such as gender, education, and past work experience, are highly 
predictive of case outcomes); Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1342–43 
(experiential knowledge supplements, and is sometimes more important than, the legal 
rules for purposes of outcome prediction). 
 67. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 406. 
 68. See Greene & Bornstein, supra note 18, at 31–32 (discussing research showing 
that lawyers who consult with experienced colleagues regarding their outcome 
predictions make more accurate predictions). 
 69. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Henry Brighton, Can Hunches Be Rational?, 4 J.L. 
ECON. & POL’Y 155, 172 (2007). 
 70. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 106-111 (2008) (describing the role 
of intuition and emotion in judicial decision making). 
 71. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1346 nn. 24–25 (discussing research 
indicating that lawyers draw heavily upon their own experiences in making decisions). 
 72. POSNER, supra note 70, at 108 (“Thus, the more experienced the judge, the more 
confidence he is apt to repose in his intuitive reactions . . . .”); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., 
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anecdotal and other evidence that judges and juries do not decide cases 
merely by analyzing the individual elements and defenses; rather, they 
balance that analysis against their intuitive sense of what justice demands 
in an individual case.73 If so, then balancing the element-focused analysis 
with the lawyer’s intuitive sense as to the likely outcome of a case, where 
this intuition is ultimately derived from experience, would reasonably be 
expected to improve the accuracy of the lawyer’s outcome prediction.74 
C. Empirical Information 
The third principal tool that lawyers have traditionally used to 
forecast case outcomes is empirical information about cases. While this 
tool has not historically been as widely used as the first two tools 
discussed above, empirical information is likely to become increasingly 
important in this age of data analytics, as discussed in Part V. 
The empirical information that has traditionally been used to guide 
outcome predictions has been derived from several sources. The oldest 
and most widely used source is the jury verdict reporter, which 
summarizes jury verdicts by subject matter so that lawyers can see how 
similar cases have been resolved in the past and can gain an 
understanding of the expected verdict range in similar cases.75 Jury 
verdict reporters are published in most jurisdictions. Jury verdict 
reporters are published in most jurisdictions and are prepared by private 
entities.76 The information in these reporters comes from publicly 
available court records, as well as from the attorneys that were involved 
 
The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL 
L. REV. 274, 284 (1929); see generally Mark C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic 
Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 55 (2001) (discussing the 
philosophical underpinnings of the “hunch” theory of judicial decision making).  
 73. See POSNER, supra note 70, at 110. 
 74. There is reason to believe that this type of reflective balancing between intuition 
derived from experience, on the one hand, and more deliberate analytical processes, on 
the other, is not confined to legal reasoning, but may instead be a fundamental feature of 
human cognition. See Gigerenzer & Brighton, supra note 69, at 156 (“Simple heuristics 
that ignore information can be better—faster, more frugal, and more accurate—than 
complex strategies that use all available information.”). But see Davis, supra note 55, at 
494–499 (describing some cognitive biases that may creep in when lawyers rely on 
intuition to evaluate potential case outcomes). 
 75. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 406. 
 76. Two of the largest commercial jury verdict reporters are VerdictSearch and the 
National Association of State Jury Verdict Publishers. See VERDICTSEARCH, 
www.verdictsearch.com (last visited July 30, 2018); NAT’L ASS’N STATE JURY VERDICT 
PUBLISHERS, www.juryverdicts.com (last visited July 30, 2018). 
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in the cases.77 Generally, the reporters organize the case summaries by 
type of claim, type of injury, jurisdiction, amount, plaintiff’s 
demographics, the insurer’s settlement history, etc. Originally, jury 
verdict reporters were published in print in a newsletter format. Most of 
them are now available online as well, and many of them provide access 
to large online databases of case information that the lawyer can search 
by category.78 Some of them offer research services as well, whereby a 
staff researcher will search for cases in the database that are on par with 
the case the lawyer is working on.79 
The purpose of jury verdict reporters is to provide lawyers with 
information about how cases that are similar to the cases they are 
working on have been resolved. Lawyers can then use this information to 
make reasonable predictions as to the range of expected jury verdicts in 
similar cases.80 Thus, the emphasis is different from the element-focused 
analysis discussed above in that jury verdict reporters provide guidance 
as to what is likely to happen after a case makes it to trial. The traditional 
element-focused analysis, by contrast, is geared more toward predicting 
whether a case will make it to trial at all, as it focuses primarily on the 
decisions of judges and not the actions of juries. Jury verdict reporters, 
therefore, provide an additional outcome-prediction tool that lawyers can 
use to assess both the likelihood of a plaintiff’s verdict and the potential 
size of such a verdict in the event a case proceeds to trial. 
Another source of empirical information that is more limited in 
terms of its accessibility is confidential settlement data. Attorneys who 
work with insurance companies, for example, have the benefit of the 
insurer’s collected settlement and jury-verdict data from earlier cases the 
insurer has litigated to help inform their outcome predictions. In one 
respect, this information is narrower than that found in jury verdict 
reporters, insofar as it is limited to the cases handled by that insurer 
(although some insurers may elect to pool such information for their 
 
 77. See, e.g., Online Verdict Search Tool, VERDICTSEARCH, 
http://verdictsearch.com/online-verdict-search-tool/ (last visited July 30, 2018).  
 78. Online commercial research providers like Westlaw and Lexis also offer verdict 
research tools. See, e.g., Westlaw Jury Verdicts, THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL SOLUTIONS, 
https://tmsnrt.rs/2AqwJKt (last visited July 30, 2018); LexisNexis Verdict & Settlement 
Analyzer, LEXISNEXIS, https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/verdict-and-
settlement-analyzer.page (last visited July 30, 2018). 
 79. See, e.g., Custom Verdicts and Settlements Research on Call, VERDICTSEARCH, 
http://verdictsearch.com/custom-research/ (last visited July 30, 2018). 
 80. MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 406. 
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collective use). However, in other respects it is broader: for one thing, 
the insurers are generally going to have more extensive information 
about the facts, and for another, they have information concerning 
settlements, in addition to verdicts. This gives the lawyer a more 
comprehensive picture of possible case outcomes, as most cases settle 
prior to trial.81 Jury verdict reporters, by contrast, are unable to obtain 
information about most settlements, due to the confidentiality clauses 
contained in most settlement agreements.82 
The third source of empirical information that is used to inform 
outcome predictions is jury research. Lawyers can hire jury-research 
firms to consult with them on cases,83 and these firms provide lawyers 
empirical information in two principal ways. First, they can provide 
information about jury behavior generally, based upon their own 
research. Second, they can empanel mock juries that sit through practice 
trials and evaluate the dispute in question firsthand. This allows the 
lawyers to try out different arguments and strategies and see how 
effective they are with the mock jury, and it also provides them 
information about how an actual jury is likely to resolve the dispute.84 
The information derived from a mock jury is of a different nature from 
that obtained from either jury verdict reports or from compilations of 
settlement data, insofar as the latter two sources focus on actual results 
from past cases, whereas a mock jury verdict relies on a hypothetical 
assessment of facts that are identical to the prospective case. The 
 
 81. See Kaster, supra note 26, at 43 & n.1. 
 82. Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality 
in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 285 (1999) (observing that 
confidentiality agreements are frequently used to hide from public view the terms of 
settlements and the underlying facts); Scott A. Moss, Illuminating Secrecy: A New 
Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L. REV. 867, 867 (2007) 
(“Even the most hotly contested lawsuits typically end in a confidential settlement . . . .”).   
 83. See generally Robert F. Ruckman et al., Focusing Your Case Through Jury 
Research: Mock Trials and Other Tools, THE BRIEF, Spring 2017, at 58 (describing the 
basic tools of jury research consultants). 
 84. See Jeh Charles Johnson, Mock Juries: Why Use Them?, LITIGATION, Winter 
2009, at 32; Jerry W. Thomas, Mock Juries, DECISION ANALYST (1993), 
https://www.decisionanalyst.com/media/downloads/MockJuries.pdf. For a good summary 
of how mock juries are used and how the process proceeds, see Mary A. Bedikian & 
Jerome D. Hill, The Ultimate Power of Persuasion: Using the Mock Trial to Enhance 
Litigation Strategy, 72 MICH. B.J. 1046 (1993).  
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drawback to jury research is that it is very expensive, and therefore it is 
of limited availability to practitioners in many cases.85 
The principal tools of case forecasting, then, are: (1) the traditional 
element-focused analysis based on legal research, (2) the experience of 
seasoned lawyers, and (3) empirical information about how similar cases 
have been resolved in the past, compiled from jury verdict reporters, and, 
in certain cases, from compilations of settlement data and jury research 
information. The following section of this article examines how effective 
these tools are in terms of predicting likely litigation outcomes, looking 
with particular focus at the traditional element-focused analysis. 
IV. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE TRADITIONAL TOOLS 
The tools lawyers have traditionally used to predict case outcomes 
have a number of limitations. As a result, outcome prediction—
notwithstanding its major importance to the practice of law—has always 
been a rough science, its accuracy leaving much to be desired.86 This 
section examines the limitations of the traditional tools of outcome 
prediction, with a particular focus on the element-focused analysis.87 
 
 85. See generally Thomas, supra note 84, at 1. Some research information regarding 
jury behavior in a generic sense is published in academic journals. See, e.g., Robert J. 
MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046 (1989) 
(offering an example of an early research piece on jury behavior). But generic 
information of this type is not as valuable for purposes of outcome prediction as case-
specific information. 
 86. See Kaster, supra note 26, at 44–45 (discussing research on the degree to which 
attorneys value cases incorrectly, and assessing reasons for the shortcoming); Goodman-
Delahanty et al., supra note 35, at 133.  
 87. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the traditional tools, clients continue to pay 
handsomely for lawyerly advice, indicating at least a market belief that lawyers’ 
prognosticative skills have value. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a 
Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 312 (1997). But then again, people pay 
good money for tarot-card and palm readings as well, which probably says more about 
many people’s strong desire to know the future than about the actual success of 
traditional case forecasting. In theory, the accuracy of lawyer outcome predictions could 
be tested. In fact, a recent study is enlightening as to the accuracy of the traditional tools. 
See Daniel Martin Katz et al., Predicting the Behavior of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: A General Approach 1 (July 27, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1407.6333.pdf (describing a forecasting model that correctly predicts 
with approximately 70% accuracy the outcomes of Supreme Court decisions, which is 
approximately the same success rate as expert Supreme Court watchers). Presumably, a 
similar study could be undertaken of trial court outcomes, using focus groups to test the 
accuracy of lawyers’ predictions. But currently no such data are publicly available. 
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A. The Element-Focused Analysis 
As a predictive tool, the traditional element-focused analysis 
lawyers use to forecast case results has a number of shortcomings. This 
is primarily because its accuracy depends upon an overly simplified view 
of how legal analysis works. In order to accurately predict how a 
prospective case will come out using the traditional element-focused 
analysis, the lawyer making the prediction must be able to rely on the 
consistent applicability of legal rules to known facts. In other words, it 
must be the case that the rules can be clearly ascertained, that the facts 
are known, and that relevantly similar factual contexts can be compared 
so as to determine the applicability of the rules. And it must be the case 
that the rules will be consistently applied in future cases, in the same way 
they were in past cases.88 
There are several inherent problems with this approach, however, 
that hinder its reliability as a predictive tool. These include: (1) 
uncertainty as to the precise facts that should be applied to the analysis; 
(2) uncertainty as to the precise scope of the legal rules that should be 
applied to the analysis; (3) the difficulty in assessing the legal 
significance of certain facts; (4) the difficulty in accounting for non-
doctrinal considerations that may affect the outcome of the case; (5) 
limitations in the types of information that can be derived from published 
opinions; and (6) the difficulty in making probability assessments in any 
precise way using the element-focused analysis. Most of these problems 
have been widely recognized—though not necessarily in the context of 
outcome prediction. The final factor, however, has not received 
significant attention in the scholarly literature and merits a more detailed 
examination. The remainder of this section discusses each factor in turn. 
1. Factual Uncertainty 
The first problem with the traditional element-focused analysis is 
that it relies on accurate factual comparisons between the prospective 
case and case precedents,89 and yet there is frequently uncertainty as to 
the facts in a prospective (or even ongoing) case.90 This is particularly a 
problem at the beginning of a case when the element-focused analysis is 
 
 88. Smith, supra note 42, at 15–16; Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1342. 
 89. See Smith, supra note 42, at 13–16.  
 90. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND xii–xiii, xix (Peter Smith 
Publishing 1970) (1930). 
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often used to assess the viability of a particular cause of action. At this 
stage of the proceeding, the lawyer must rely primarily upon the factual 
account provided by the client, together with any additional information 
the lawyer can glean from any documents provided by the client, and any 
independent initial fact investigation the lawyer undertakes.91 
The problem with relying on the client’s account alone, of course, is 
that the client’s account may be biased; thus, the facts that ultimately 
emerge at trial may not be in keeping with the story that the client 
reported to the lawyer during the initial client interview.92 Furthermore, 
the lawyer’s subsequent factual investigation, along with the discovery 
process, may reveal surprises. Unanticipated documents may turn up, and 
witnesses may provide somewhat different accounts of the facts than the 
lawyer may have anticipated at the beginning of the case. Additionally, 
the trial itself is often unpredictable. Witness credibility and likeability 
are important factors in the jury’s assessment of the facts,93 and it is 
difficult to work this information into an element-focused analysis, even 
if credibility can be accurately assessed pre-trial. Also, the trier of fact 
may not weigh the evidence the way the lawyer initially thought they 
would, and the judge may exclude or limit the use of certain evidence at 
trial that the lawyer was intending to rely on to build the case.94 
Therefore, the difficulty of knowing in advance just how the finder 
of fact will weave the evidence into a particular narrative makes the 
application of the legal rules to the facts more difficult for the traditional 
element-focused analysis than might be apparent at first blush. 
2. Legal Uncertainty 
This difficulty is frequently compounded by uncertainty as to the 
legal rules. The traditional element-focused analysis used to assist 
predictions depends upon the ability of the lawyer to ascertain the 
controlling legal rules and apply them to the facts of the prospective 
 
 91. MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 89–90. 
 92. See MICHAEL E. TIGAR, NINE PRINCIPLES OF LITIGATION AND LIFE 240 (2009) 
(“The client may not level with you about the documents. The client may shade the 
truth.”). 
 93. MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 405–06. 
 94. See Smith, supra note 42, at 23 (“[T]he court may not draw the same inference 
from the historical facts as you, your client, a witness, or the opposing party did.”).  
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case.95 Yet it is often unclear what exactly the parameters of the rules are 
and how exactly they apply to the prospective case. 
For one thing, it is often difficult to synthesize a cogent legal rule 
from disparate cases.96 The intellectual exercise of distilling a rule out of 
multiple cases that promulgate somewhat different and nuanced rules is 
not a determinative endeavor; rather, it is often possible to connect the 
dots in more than one way (that is, to formulate a synthesizing rule in 
different ways), and it is not always apparent in advance how a court will 
do so.97 
Furthermore, the legal rules themselves can be vague or ambiguous. 
Hart’s well-known hypothetical about a statute prohibiting “vehicles” in 
a park is a classic example of a vague textual rule; as Hart argued, it is 
not at all obvious from the mere meanings of the words whether a 
bicycle (or say a bicycle with a supplemental electric engine) is a 
“vehicle.”98 Thus, there is often uncertainty as to how a court will 
construe the “penumbra” around the core of a rule.99 Furthermore, legal 
rules that are derived from cases, rather than textual sources, can be even 
more vague and indeterminate.100 Such rules are generally highly 
dependent upon the particular factual context in which they arise and are 
subject to refinement and modification if the facts in subsequent cases 
are significantly different.101 
To be sure, comparisons of the facts of precedents to the facts of the 
prospective case can often shed light on vague terms. For example, one 
 
 95.  See id. at 10–23; see also Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (1989) (discussing the link between clear legal rules and 
predictability). 
 96. NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING,’ supra note 41, at 18–19. For a classic 
legal-realist formulation of this argument, see FRANK, supra note 90, at 159–71 (arguing 
that precedents are inherently indeterminate in terms of possible rule syntheses). 
 97. FRANK, supra note 90, at 163 (“Every lawyer of experience comes to know 
(more or less unconsciously) that in the great majority of cases, the precedents are none 
too good as bases of prediction.”). 
 98. H. L. A. Hart, Positivism & the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 593, 606–15 (1958). 
 99. Id. at 607; see also DERNBACH, supra note 54, at 44. 
 100. This makes it easier for advocates, who can employ some creativity in 
formulating the applicable rule, but it makes formulating a rule more challenging for 
outcome prediction because the lawyer essentially has to make a prediction as to how the 
reviewing court will formulate the rule. See NEUMANN ET AL., LEGAL REASONING, supra 
note 41, at 93–96, 104. 
 101. See id. at 73–74 (discussing how there are sometimes gaps in the law due to a 
lack of sufficient precedents on point). 
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can compare and contrast cases that have granted summary judgment to 
the defendant in IIED cases based upon the severity of the emotional 
distress. If a certain level of emotional distress was deemed not to be 
severe enough to satisfy the severity element in a particular precedent, 
then the lawyer can conclude that a similar or lesser level of emotional 
distress will not suffice in a prospective case. However, the precedents 
may still leave significant room for doubt. Because the number of 
precedents is frequently quite limited, there is often a significant gray 
area remaining into which the facts of the prospective case may fall. 
Legal rules as articulated by the courts are thus, by their nature, open-
ended with respect to their potential applicability, and there frequently is 
not enough precedent to provide meaningful guidance as to how they 
will be applied in new circumstances.102 
Finally, legal rules are not entirely static, and the governing 
decisional law interpreting a rule may evolve during the course of the 
case. What looked like a solid case at the beginning of a litigation matter 
may look less certain if an ensuing legal precedent reshapes the 
governing rule, and this too can affect outcome prediction. 
Therefore, for these reasons, determining exactly what “the law” is 
that should be applied to a given factual scenario is often less 
straightforward than it might seem at first blush, further limiting the 
effectiveness of the element-focused analysis as a predictive tool. 
3. The Difficulty in Assessing the Legal Significance of Certain 
Facts 
A related difficulty arises from the challenge of trying to ascertain 
from reported court opinions exactly which facts are legally significant to 
a particular holding. This too adds an element of uncertainty to the 
element-focused analysis because it means that determining which 
potential precedents are really on point can sometimes be difficult.103 
 
 102. Id. at 19 (“[O]nce a rule has been formulated, situations will inevitably crop up 
that the rulemaking or did not anticipate her could not have been expected to 
contemplate.”); see also Schauer, Precedent, supra note 46, at 576–79 (arguing that the 
ability of precedents to constrain future decision-making depends upon the ability of the 
decision-maker to determine that the legally relevant facts are similar). 
 103. See Schauer, Precedent, supra note 46, at 577–88 (discussing the factors that 
determine which facts are legally relevant). 
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Consider, as an example, the development of the tort of IIED in 
Florida case law. In Slocum v. Fair Food Store of Florida Inc.,104 which 
was the first appellate case to consider whether such a tort existed in 
Florida, the Florida Supreme Court held that the tort, even if valid in 
Florida, would not apply to the factual context in which the defendant 
caused the emotional distress to the plaintiff merely by stating “you stink 
to me.”105 However, in the next case to consider the tort, Korbin v. 
Berlin,106 the Florida Court of Appeals found that a cause of action was 
stated where the defendant told a six-year-old girl things like: “do you 
know that your mother took a man away from his wife”; “do you know 
that God is going to punish them”; and “do you know that a man is 
sleeping in your mother’s room.”107 In Korbin, the court held that a cause 
of action was stated because a reasonable jury could find that these 
statements were “calculated to cause the child ‘severe emotional 
distress.’”108 The court concluded that “[t]he alleged statements and the 
manner and circumstances under which they were communicated 
municated [sic] to the child leave little room to doubt they were made 
with a purpose and intent to shame her, and to shock the sensibilities of 
this child of tender years.”109 Additionally, the court noted that 
“[r]elating, as they did, to the child’s mother, the content and import of 
the statements” were sufficient to state a cause of action.110 
From the Court of Appeal’s holding, it is apparent that the age of 
the defendant (young Ms. Korbin was just six years old) was a legally 
significant factor to be taken into account in future cases.111 In other 
words, a lawyer interpreting Korbin would reasonably know from the 
language of the court opinion that the bar for IIED is going to be 
somewhat lower for outrageous verbal statements involving children than 
it would be for adults. What is less clear, however, is what exactly the 
court means when it refers to the “content and import” of the statements 
as being a decisive factor.112 For example, should a lawyer comparing a 
future case to Korbin on its facts also take into account the fact that the 
 
 104. Slocum v. Food Fair Stores of Fla., Inc., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958). 
 105. Id. at 398. 
 106. Korbin v. Berlin, 177 So. 2d 551 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965). 
 107. Id. at 552–53. 
 108. Id. at 553. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. at 552–53. 
 112. See id. at 553. 
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defendant in Korbin alleged sexual impropriety on the part of the child’s 
mother? Or is that fact immaterial? Would the holding in the Slocum case 
perhaps have been different if, instead of telling the defendant “you stink 
to me,” the defendant had impugned the plaintiff’s virtue, as in Korbin? 
A reasonable argument could be made (by analogy to defamation law, 
for example) that sexual accusations are more likely to be actionable than 
accusations of body odor. However, it is not apparent from the court’s 
holding in Korbin that this is so, and thus, it is not apparent that the 
sexual nature of the statements is a legally significant fact that could be 
applied to a new set of facts.113 In other words, the judicial opinion may 
not reveal all of the factual considerations the judge actually relied upon 
in reaching the decision.114 
Thus, in addition to problems of factual and legal uncertainty, the 
element-focused analysis is hindered by the challenge in certain cases of 
determining precisely which facts have legal significance to a particular 
holding. 
4. The Difficulty in Assessing the Significance of Non-Doctrinal 
Considerations 
A further uncertainty in the traditional element-focused analysis 
stems from its difficulty in accounting for certain non-doctrinal 
considerations that may affect an outcome prediction. 
First, there are economic and psychological factors that can skew 
the analysis by leading lawyers to take an overly optimistic view of the 
client’s case. Most obviously, there is often an economic incentive to 
favor the client’s position.115 Thus, plaintiff’s lawyers will have a 
tendency to view the cause of action (and, of course, the lawyer’s own 
 
 113. See Emily Sherwin, Judges as Rulemakers, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 920 (2006) 
(describing how judges’ reliance on simplifying heuristics leads decision-makers to 
“focus on facts that come readily to mind at the expense” of less apparent, but equally 
important, background factors). 
 114. See Kevin D. Ashley & Stefanie Brüninghaus, Computer Models for Legal 
Prediction, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 309, 315–16 (2006) (“Judges may not have disclosed the 
features that influenced their decision or stated their rationales accurately or 
completely.”); see also Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 35 (arguing that insofar as “facts or 
factors not shown in the [judge’s] report are at work . . . the opinion gives us a misleading 
picture of what happened, and therefore, misleading basis for prophecy of what will 
happen in the future”). 
 115. This is sometimes called “optimism bias.” See Katz, supra note 16, at 929; see 
also Kaster, supra note 26, at 45; Oren Bar-Gill, The Origin and Persistence of Optimism 
in Litigation, 22 OXFORD J. L. ECON. & ORG. 490, 491 (2006). 
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abilities)116 through rose-colored glasses. This is particularly problematic 
in cases where the potential plaintiff will be paying an hourly fee; but 
even in more traditional contingent-fee cases, it can still play a role. 
Similarly, defense lawyers paid on an hourly basis have an obvious 
economic incentive to prolong a litigation matter, even if an early 
settlement might be in the client’s interests. 
In addition, several other cognitive biases may skew a lawyer’s 
predictions.117 For example, clients tend not to favor lawyers who are 
pessimistic or perceived to be overly sympathetic to the opponent’s 
position.118 Taken together, these factors create a tendency to 
unrealistically assess the client’s prospects,119 which can lead lawyers to 
reject as unreasonable settlement offers that may, in fact, be reasonable. 
Theoretically, these psychological considerations could be taken into 
account in tempering the conclusions of an element-focused analysis. 
However, they are difficult to tease out and nearly impossible to 
quantify. 
The traditional element-focused analysis also fails to account for 
certain non-doctrinal considerations that may influence the decision-
maker(s) (i.e., the court or the jury), and thereby affect the outcome of 
the case. These include the types of considerations that legal realists 
discussed at length a number of years ago, such as the personal biases of 
the judge or jury.120 Judges and juries are not machines, and they cannot 
be counted on to apply legal rules to the facts in a purely mechanical 
 
 116. See Green & Bornstein, supra note 18, at 31 (arguing that “lawyers may express 
heightened confidence in their abilities in order to attract and maintain a clientele”). 
 117. See Snyder, supra note 33, at 841–54 (discussing various cognitive factors that 
can distort predictions); see also Davis, supra note 55, at 495–98 (discussing different 
cognitive biases that affect case evaluations).  
 118. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1347 n.27 (discussing research 
indicating that lawyerly overconfidence may be a “necessary trait to attract and retain 
clients”); see also Kaster, supra note 26, at 45 (“If the client communicates the 
expectation of hearing only positive views, and the ability to go elsewhere if unsatisfied, 
client think is even more likely.”). 
 119. See generally George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness 
and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993); see also Goodman-Delahunty et 
al., supra note 35, at 139–43 (discussing research showing that lawyers are overly 
optimistic in predicting trial outcomes). 
 120. See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 90, at xii–xiii (discussing the hidden, unconscious 
biases of trial judges that affect case outcomes). For a contemporary formulation of this 
view, see POSNER, supra note 70, at 10–11 (discussing various personal attributes that 
affect judicial decision-making). 
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manner.121 Accordingly, the traditional-element analysis is hindered by 
its inability to accurately account for factors such as the likability and 
credibility of the parties that can affect the outcome.122 It also neglects 
factors such as the reputation and success rate of the attorneys, the 
historical tendencies of the individual judge(s) assigned to the case, 
differences in the predilections of different courts (e.g., in different 
localities), etc.123 Again, this is not an intractable problem for the 
traditional element-focused analysis, since the traditional analysis can be 
balanced against and adjusted for these non-doctrinal factors. However, 
it is very difficult to weigh such factors, and this makes it difficult to 
factor them into the traditional element-focused analysis. 
5. Limitations on the Amount and Type of Information Available 
from Published Opinions 
In addition to the issues discussed above, there is an inherent 
limitation on the usefulness of the element-focused analysis due to the 
nature of its source material: i.e., published judicial opinions. Since these 
opinions (particularly those responding to pre-trial motions) focus their 
attention primarily on the proper interpretations of the law, rather than 
factual applications and determinations of damages, their usefulness is 
primarily confined to determining whether a cause of action may exist, 
rather than whether the plaintiff may succeed at trial and the amount of 
potential recovery. In the IIED example discussed above, for instance, 
most of the published opinions address motions for summary judgment 
or to dismiss, and they are primarily concerned with whether the plaintiff 
properly states a cause of action for IIED. One seminal Florida Supreme 
Court case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. McCarson,124 
addresses an appeal from a jury verdict.125 But even that opinion is 
primarily concerned with whether IIED is a recognized tort in the state of 
 
 121. POSNER, supra note 70, at 8 (“Empirical scholars have found that many judicial 
decisions, by no means limited to the Supreme Court, are strongly influenced by a 
judge’s political preferences, or by other extralegal factors. . . .”). 
 122. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 405–06. 
 123. See Leiter, supra note 87, at 312 (arguing that lawyers use informal 
“psychological, political, and cultural knowledge” to help predict judicial outcomes). 
Also see the discussion in Part V of this Article regarding Professor Schauer’s discussion 
of outcome prediction based on non-doctrinal factors. See infra notes 187–93 and 
accompanying text.  
 124. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 1985). 
 125. Id. at 278. 
OSBECK- FINAL EDITED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2018  4:54 PM 
2018] LAWYER AS SOOTHSAYER 73 
 
 
 
 
Florida, and whether the plaintiff properly states a cause of action for 
that tort.126 Thus, it provides only limited guidance as to what an IIED 
plaintiff can expect to happen if the case proceeds to trial. 
The upshot is that the element-focused analysis is primarily useful 
as a tool for predicting whether the plaintiff’s claim will survive the 
pretrial motion stage of the litigation and be allowed to proceed to trial. 
Lawyers have to look to other predictive tools, e.g., jury verdict reporters 
and settlement data, to formulate outcome predictions as to their clients’ 
chances of success at trial, and the amount of any potential recovery. 
6. The Difficulty in Making Probability Assessments in an 
Element-Focused Analysis 
Finally, there is one other problem that is intrinsic to the element-
focused analysis that has not received significant attention in the 
scholarly literature. That is the difficulty of assigning probabilities to the 
applicability of the individual elements in the traditional element-focused 
analysis, and the difficulty in making an overall probability assessment 
based upon these individual assessments. 
As to the first issue, one of the primary tenets of the element-
focused analysis is that outcome prediction is facilitated by breaking 
down a cause of action or defense into its constituent elements. In other 
words, the traditional analysis assumes that the viability of the cause of 
action or defense as a whole can best be determined by assessing the 
viability of each individual element. The viability of each individual 
element can, in turn, be assessed by looking at various IIED precedents 
discussing that element, and an overall assessment of the cause of action 
or defense will then flow from these individual assessments.127 For 
example, a lawyer examining all the Florida precedents on the severity 
element of IIED and applying them to a new factual scenario tries to 
determine the likelihood that the court or jury in the present case would 
find that the severity element was satisfied. Then, after doing the same 
with respect to each of the other three IIED elements, the lawyer will be 
in a good position to judge whether the cause of action as a whole will 
succeed. Thus, the more contingent elements the plaintiff has to prove, 
 
 126. Id. at 278–79. 
 127. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 5–7. 
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the lower the likelihood, other things being equal, that the defendant will 
prevail.128 
For the reasons discussed in the preceding subsections, however, 
determining whether an element is satisfied is often not something that 
can be ascertained with any reasonable degree of certainty. For example, 
as discussed above, merely by looking at the various IIED precedents in 
which the severity element was found to be applicable or not, the lawyer 
cannot always assess the likelihood that the trier of fact will find the 
severity element to be met in the prospective case. Determining the 
likelihood that a particular court or jury will find a particular element to 
be met is far from a precise science.129 
But even assuming that lawyers can make reasonably accurate 
probability assessments with respect to the individual elements in a cause 
of action or defense, there remains a further obstacle: determining the 
likelihood that the cause of action or defense as a whole is likely to 
succeed, based upon the likelihood that the finder of fact will determine 
that each individual element is met. This task raises some difficult 
theoretical issues that seem, practically speaking, to be intractable. 
To see why, consider again the IIED example discussed above. To 
establish a cause of action for IIED, a plaintiff must convince the finder 
of fact that each of the four required elements is met: (1) the action was 
intentional; (2) the action caused emotional distress; (3) the emotional 
distress was severe; and (4) the action giving rise to the distress was 
“outrageous,” as that term has come to be defined through decisional 
law.130 If the defendant succeeds in convincing the finder of fact that any 
one of these elements is not met, then the defendant prevails. Now 
assume that the plaintiff’s lawyer believes that there is an 80 percent 
likelihood of persuading the finder of fact with respect to each of the four 
elements. Is it likely that the action as a whole will succeed? And if so, 
what is the probability? 
At first blush, it may seem that the answer to the first question is 
clearly “yes,” even if the answer to the second question is not obvious. 
But in fact, even the answer to the first question is complicated. To 
assess the likelihood that the cause of action for IIED will succeed, the 
 
 128. See David A. Moran, Jury Uncertainty, Elemental Independence and the 
Conjunction Paradox: A Response to Allen and Jehl, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 945, 950 
(2003). 
 129. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 35, at 149–50. 
 130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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starting point in a probability analysis would be to consider each separate 
element as an independent variable, just as one would with a series of 
coin tosses. For example, the probability of getting four “heads” in a row 
flipping a coin is only 1/16, even though the probability of getting 
“heads” with respect to each individual toss is 1/2. In other words, the 
basic rule in determining the probability that a series of (independent) 
events will occur is determined by multiplying the odds that each 
individual event will occur.131 Accordingly, in the IIED example given 
above, the starting point for determining the probability that the action as 
a whole will succeed is determined by multiplying the likelihood that 
each individual element will be satisfied. Thus, for this calculation, the 
probability that the trier of fact will find all four elements to be met is 0.8 
× 0.8 × 0.8 × 0.8 = 0.41 or 41%, which means that the plaintiff is actually 
more likely to lose than win. 
It is tempting to conclude from this that there is a tendency for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to make overly optimistic outcome predictions, since 
what at first blush looked intuitively likely—that the cause of action as a 
whole would probably succeed—is in fact unlikely.132 However, even 
that conclusion is questionable because it is based upon an assumption, 
as noted above, that the individual variables (i.e., the elements of the tort) 
are independent of each other, when often there is probably some degree 
of interdependence between them, due to the holistic nature of judicial 
decision-making.133 In other words, the factors that influence the court’s 
 
 131. See IAN HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 41–
43 (2001). 
 132. This is related to an evidentiary quandary that has sometimes been referred to as 
the “conjunction problem” or the “conjunction fallacy.” See Saul Levmore, Conjunction 
and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 724 (2001).  
 133. See Moran, supra note 128, at 946. Furthermore, there is a counter-veiling factor 
at work when a plaintiff brings multiple claims for recovery. The plaintiff in a civil 
matter can (and often does), allege more than one cause of action in a lawsuit. See 
MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 61–64 (discussing the pros and cons of asserting 
multiple claims). Suppose, for example, that the IIED claim is one of only three causes of 
action the plaintiff has alleged in an action, and suppose further that each cause of action 
is determined to have a 41% chance of success. Then the odds that the plaintiff will fail 
on each count is accordingly 59% (1 – 0.41), and thus the odds that plaintiff will fail on 
all three counts is, per the multiplication rule discussed above, 0.59 × 0.59 × 0.59, which 
comes out to a probability of 0.205, or 20.5%. See HACKING, supra note 131, at 42 
(discussing the multiplication rule of probability). Similarly, the odds that the plaintiff 
will succeed on at least one of its three causes of action alleged is accordingly 0.795, or 
79.5% (1 – 0.205). Id. Therefore, even though plaintiff is likely to fail on each of the 
three causes of action considered independently, it follows from the multiplication rule of 
probability that the plaintiff is quite likely (almost 80%) to succeed on at least one of the 
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resolution of one element may well affect its assessment of the other 
elements too.134 However, multiplying the individual probabilities of the 
variables in a series to determine the probability that the series as a 
whole will occur is appropriate only where the variables are independent, 
i.e., where the resolution of each variable has no effect of the resolution 
of the other variables.135 For example, the probability of getting four 
“heads” in a row in a series of coin tosses is determined by multiplying 
the odds of each individual coin toss (1/2 or 50%) because no one coin 
toss affects any other coin toss.136 However, where one event may affect 
the likelihood that another will occur, a simple multiplication of the 
individual probabilities will not prove accurate, and a more complicated 
calculation is necessary.137 
Suppose, for example, that two evenly matched teams are in a 
World Series. Prior to the first game, statisticians would reasonably 
assign a 50% likelihood that a given team would win with respect to each 
individual game. If Team A wins the first three games, it is reasonable to 
assume that the odds of Team A winning the fourth game will be deemed 
higher than 50%, in order to take into account factors such as momentum 
and demoralization of the opponent. But how much higher would the 
odds be? The answer to that question cannot be determined purely 
mathematically, though empirical data about how prior teams performed 
when down 3-0 in a World Series could shed some light on it. 
Bringing this back to the traditional element-focused analysis, there 
is reason to believe that the individual variables in the element focused 
analysis (i.e., the likelihood that the trier of fact will find each element to 
be satisfied) are similarly interdependent. In other words, the trier of 
facts’ resolution of one element may well affect the resolution of one or 
more other elements.138 As discussed above in Section III.B, there is 
reason to think that experienced lawyers tend to analyze cases in a more 
holistic way, rather than merely parsing the likelihood that each element 
 
plaintiff’s causes of action. Again, however, this calculation assumes the independence of 
each individual cause of action, which is probably not accurate for the same reason the 
individual elements are often not independent. See Moran, supra note 128, at 946.  
 134. See Moran, supra note 128, at 946.  
 135. See HACKING, supra note 131, at 42. 
 136. JOHN W. FOREMAN, DATA SMART: USING DATA SCIENCE TO TRANSFORM 
INFORMATION INTO INSIGHT 81 (2014). 
 137. See id. at 80–82 (discussing conditional probabilities and Bayes’ Rule). 
 138. See Moran, supra note 128, at 950–52. 
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of the cause of action will be satisfied.139 So too there is evidence that 
judges and juries decide cases in a more holistic way, and that they 
balance a more intuitive view as to which party should prevail in a case 
with a strict analysis of the separate elements.140 If so, then the trier of 
fact’s resolution of one element would tend to affect the trier of fact’s 
assessment of the other elements, and this interdependence would have 
to be factored into the outcome prediction, just as it would in the World 
Series example discussed above. 
However, whereas statisticians can in that example determine (with 
some modicum of accuracy) the degree of interdependence of the 
variables by looking at past World Series results,141 no such general data 
is currently available with respect to judicial decision-making. Thus, it 
will not be possible, practically speaking, for a lawyer to assess with 
accuracy the likelihood that a cause of action will succeed, even if it 
were possible to assign probabilities to each individual element. For 
while it can safely be assumed that the odds of success are higher than 
merely multiplying out the individual probabilities of the elements would 
lead us to believe (due to the likely interdependence of the elements),142 
there is no publicly available information as to how much higher. Thus, 
one of the fundamental axioms of the element-focused analysis is 
inherently flawed. 
B. Limitations on the Other Traditional Tools of Outcome Prediction 
The previous section discussed a variety of problems afflicting the 
traditional element-focused analysis that lawyers use to make outcome 
predictions. Fortunately, this is not the only predictive tool available to 
lawyers. Rather, as discussed above in Part III, lawyers, particularly 
 
 139. See Gigerenzer & Brighton, supra note 69, at 171–72. 
 140. See POSNER, supra note 70, at 107–09; see also supra notes 65–66 and 
accompanying text. 
 141. For example, statistical records may show that historically only one team in 
twenty-five (4%) that was down three games to none has ever won a World Series, 
whereas the odds that an evenly matched team would win four straight is normally 6.3% 
(1/2 × 1/2 × 1/2 × 1/2 = 1/16 or 0.0625), which would provide some evidence of the 
momentum effect. The sample set is so small, however, that one could not rely with any 
degree of confidence on the empirical data. See generally HACKING, supra note 16, at 
229–45 (discussing issues with statistical inferences based on small or unrepresentative 
samples). If, for example, a team overcame a 3–0 deficit the following year and won the 
World Series, the odds would change significantly based on the then-cumulative data—
from 1/25 or 4%, to 2/26 or 7.6%—leading to the opposite conclusion. 
 142. See Moran, supra note 128, at 950–52. 
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seasoned lawyers, also rely heavily on experience—their own and that of 
other lawyers—in assessing potential outcomes, and they also have 
available to them certain empirical resources, such as jury verdict 
reporters, jury research, and, in some cases, settlement data. However, 
while these additional tools provide useful supplements to the traditional 
element-focused analysis, they are not without their own significant 
limitations. 
1. Lawyerly Experience 
The first supplemental tool available to lawyers in making outcome 
predictions is lawyerly experience—their own, as well as that of other 
lawyers they consult. For seasoned lawyers, in particular, personal 
experience is a very valuable tool, just as it is for seasoned physicians in 
making diagnoses and in predicting the course of various diseases. As 
discussed above in Section III.B, experience enables a lawyer to broaden 
the scope of the analysis, bringing in non-doctrinal considerations such 
as the lawyer’s knowledge of a particular judge’s propensities, or the 
tendencies of juries in particular localities to favor plaintiffs or 
defendants in certain types of cases.143 Furthermore, experience enables 
lawyers to take a more holistic approach to outcome prediction, 
evaluating the big picture by relying on intuitions about likely outcomes 
that are honed from past cases.144 
While experience is undoubtedly a valuable tool in the lawyer’s 
arsenal, it is certainly not without its limitations.145 For one thing, 
experience is obviously developed over time, so more junior lawyers will 
be quite limited in this respect. However, even for more seasoned 
lawyers, information derived from experience tends to be 
impressionistic, as it relies upon the accuracy of the lawyer’s memory, 
and is a filtered interpretation of past events that may be influenced by 
the lawyer’s own beliefs and biases about the law, and about people and 
institutions.146 Additionally, personal experience is, by its nature, 
 
 143. See supra notes 115–23 and accompanying text. 
 144. See Gigerenzer & Brighton, supra note 69, at 171–72. For a discussion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of this reliance on lawyerly intuition, see Davis, supra note 
55, at 494–99.  
 145. In fact, one study indicates that lawyers’ accuracy in predicting outcomes is not 
significantly enhanced by experience. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 35, at 
133. 
 146. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1340 n.12 (citing research 
indicating that lawyers “operate with beliefs and biases that can cloud their judgment”); 
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limited.147 Even in fields such as securities trading, while a broker’s 
experience with how other clients have fared with respect to certain types 
of investments is certainly valuable, it is not a substitute for actual 
experimental data on stock performance that transcends the broker’s 
personal experience.148 And in law, personal experience is even more 
limited because lawyers have less to go on, given the relatively few 
clients most of them have as compared to, say, stock-brokers and 
physicians. 
Furthermore, lawyerly experience as a predictive tool is subject to 
several of the same problems that afflict the element-focused analysis. 
Experience does not provide an end-around to the challenges of factual 
uncertainty and legal uncertainty. Lawyers are still reliant on limited 
sources of information, such as the client’s account of facts, when 
initially assessing a case.149 Likewise, the lawyer’s past cases will never 
be entirely on par factually with a prospective matter, so how a court will 
apply a vague legal rule to a new legal situation remains subject to 
doubt.150 Furthermore, the lawyer will not easily be able to get around the 
problem of identifying exactly which facts are legally significant, 
because a lawyer generally has only limited information about what facts 
really influenced the court or jury’s decision.151 
Thus, while experience is certainly a helpful guide to the lawyer, it 
is not by itself a particularly accurate source of outcome prediction in 
individual cases. 
2. Empirical Information 
The other principal predictive tool discussed in Part III was 
empirical information available to the lawyer, in particular, jury verdict 
 
see also Kaster, supra note 26, at 44–45 (discussing the factors that can cloud a lawyer’s 
judgment); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883, 897–
901 (2006) (discussing distortions that arise in judicial decision-making due to judges’ 
reliance on simplifying heuristics that are based in part on cognitive biases). 
 147. See Snyder, supra note 33, at 849. 
 148. As a result, medical advice is heavily dependent on experimental data. This is 
true in a number of other fields as well, such as the stock brokerage industry. See 
Katz,supra note 16, at 948–49 (discussing the increasing reliance on data-driven 
decision-making in the stock-brokerage industry).  
 149. See MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 89–90. 
 150. See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text. 
 151. See FRANK, supra note 90, at 119–24. 
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reporters, jury research, and, in certain cases, settlement data. While 
these too are helpful tools, they too have some significant limitations. 
With respect to jury verdict reporters, they are limited in terms of 
the types of information they provide (and also, to some extent, in terms 
of their reliability, given that some of the information comes from the 
lawyers involved in the case). Often, for example, they provide only 
cursory factual summaries, which exacerbates the problems created by 
factual uncertainty and legal uncertainty.152 As discussed in Section IV.A 
above, it is difficult to compare cases on their facts when factual 
information about the prospective case is of limited reliability (due to 
factual uncertainty), and the information about the precedent case is very 
limited in scope.153 Furthermore, since the factual information available 
in jury verdict reporters is not generally presented in a very detailed 
manner, the ability of lawyers to draw generalizations about specific jury 
findings is limited. 
As discussed in Section III.C above, some lawyers are able to draw 
upon case-specific jury research tools to supplement jury verdict 
reporters.154 These have the advantage of providing very detailed and 
case-specific information about a prospective case and its likely 
outcome, and they also allow lawyers to experiment with different 
adversarial approaches.155 However, jury research tools are also limited 
insofar as they do not address whether a cause of action is likely to 
survive a motion to dismiss or summary judgment; rather, they only shed 
light on the likely outcome in the event of a trial. In that respect, jury 
research tools suffer from a limitation that is the reverse of the limitation 
discussed above with respect to the element-focused analysis.156 In 
addition, mock trials are one-sided as to the nature of the evidence, in 
that they do not allow the mock jury to hear the other side’s actual 
case.157 Mock trials are also limited insofar as they tend to be shorter than 
actual trials, relying on truncated evidentiary presentations.158 
 
 152. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 153. See supra notes 89–102 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Johnson, supra note 84, at 32–33. 
 156. See supra Section IV.A.5. 
 157. DAVID TABAK, NERA ECONOMIC CONSULTING, SETTLEMENT REASONABLENESS 
FROM NEGOTIATION TO SETTLEMENT DISPUTES 4 (2012), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB_Settlement_Reasonab
leness_0212.pdf. 
 158. Id. 
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Furthermore, as discussed in Part III, mock trials are very expensive, and 
thus they are generally limited to only high-dollar cases.159 Even testing a 
case on a single mock jury or focus group requires a substantial 
expenditure, and to ensure greater accuracy, it would be necessary to try 
the prospective case to multiple mock juries, to eliminate possible 
idiosyncrasies of a single panel. However, the costs associated with 
doing that narrows the usefulness of mock juries as a predictive tool to a 
very small subset of cases. 
Finally, as discussed in Section III.C above, settlement data can be 
used to assist lawyers in making outcome predictions. Such data is often 
valuable in assessing a potential client’s exposure or expected recovery, 
particularly since the great majority of cases ultimately settle prior to 
trial. To be sure, settlement data will not provide direct information 
about the prospects for a case’s surviving a dispositive motion, such as a 
summary judgment motion, nor will it provide direct information about 
the expected outcome at trial. Still, it is a valuable predictive tool that 
certain lawyers rely on heavily in assessing cases.160 Relying on past 
cases, for example, an insurance defense lawyer can make a reasonably 
accurate assessment of the settlement value of a case and can make 
appropriate settlement decisions accordingly. 
The main drawback to the use of settlement data as a predictive tool 
(as in the case with jury research) is that it is not readily available to 
most lawyers, since only certain clients, such as insurance companies and 
large corporations, face repeated litigation and are thus in a position to 
acquire large quantities of useful settlement data. Additionally, since the 
majority of settlements are confidential and not available to the public,161 
most lawyers have no way of tapping into this pool of information. 
In sum, empirical information serves as a valuable predictive tool 
for lawyers, but its value is limited insofar as much of the most useful 
information is unavailable to the majority of lawyers who make outcome 
predictions. 
V. USING DATA SCIENCE TO IMPROVE OUTCOME PREDICTION 
Part IV of this article discussed the principal reasons why lawyers 
struggle with outcome prediction, using the traditional tools available to 
 
 159. See Thomas, supra note 84, at 1. 
 160. See supra notes 75–84 and accompanying test. 
 161. See supra note 82. 
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them. While those tools certainly have some predictive value, they are 
also subject to significant shortcomings and limitations that hamper their 
ability to provide helpful guidance to their clients concerning potential or 
pending legal matters. In the past few years, however, a potentially 
powerful new tool has received significant attention: the prospect of 
using data science to help lawyers make better outcome predictions. This 
part of the article discusses the potential for data science to provide 
lawyers with an additional tool to improve their outcome predictions. 
A. Data Science and Prediction 
“Data science” and “data analytics” are fairly vague terms, 
encompassing a number of different techniques analysts use to drive 
information from large sets of data. As one prominent analyst defines it, 
“[d]ata science is the transformation of data using mathematics and 
statistics into valuable insights, decisions, and products.”162 Data science 
includes traditional analytics techniques such as optimization, 
forecasting, and simulation, along with more recent innovations such as 
data mining, artificial intelligence clustering, machine-learning, and 
detection of outliers.163 
The use of such tools to make predictions is often referred to as 
“predictive analytics” or “outcome analysis.”164 Predictive analytics has 
been successfully employed in a variety of contexts. In the realm of 
politics, for example, analysts such as Nate Silver have used predictive 
analytics with some degree of success to anticipate election results.165 In 
the area of medicine, predictive analytics has shown promise in 
predicting disease outbreaks, helping physicians diagnose diseases, and 
in advancing genomics research.166 In the area of sports, predictive 
 
 162. FOREMAN, supra note 136, at xiv. 
 163. Id. Foreman’s book provides a good overview of these various predictive 
techniques and how they work. See id. at chs. 4–7. 
 164. See generally ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO PREDICT 
WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 103–220 (2013) (providing a general overview of 
predictive analytics and its uses). 
 165. See generally NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL & THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY 
PREDICTIONS FAIL BUT SOME DON’T xiii–xvii (Penguin paperback ed. 2015). 
 166. See Dan Meisler, Projects use Big Data to predict diseases, advance genomics 
analysis, THE UNIVERSITY RECORD (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://record.umich.edu/articles/projects-use-big-data-predict-diseases-advance-
genomics-analysis; see also W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 
MICH. L. REV. 421, 425–31 (2017) (discussing the use of computer-generated medical 
algorithms to assist physicians in making medical diagnoses). 
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analytics has been used for gambling purposes to predict the outcome of 
games and tournaments, as well as by teams to predict (e.g., for purposes 
of determining how much to spend on a free-agent, or which rookie to 
draft) the likelihood that a player’s career will continue its current 
trajectory or improve.167 In the field of meteorology, predictive analytics 
has been used to improve weather forecasts.168 And in the business 
world, predictive analytics has been successfully used for a variety of 
purposes. Most notably, it is used for marketing and advertising purposes 
to identify consumers in a targeted manner who might be most likely to 
purchase particular products.169 However, there are a host of other 
business uses for predictive analytics,170 ranging from consumer fraud 
detection, to evaluating consumer debt risks, to helping dating services 
find promising matches, to enabling autonomous cars to operate, to 
automatically customizing music “stations” for individual listeners,171 
and so on. 
The success of predictive analytics over the past decade or so is 
largely due to advances in the field of artificial intelligence, which have 
enabled predictive analytics to make more accurate predictions than the 
traditional forecasting models that were used to facilitate predictions in 
earlier years. The traditional forecasting models required the researcher 
 
 167. See SILVER, supra note 165, at 74–107. 
 168. Id. at 108–41. 
 169. See SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 38–40. Siegel discusses a certain retail chain that 
wanted to target a marketing campaign to those among its existing customers who are 
pregnant (e.g., in order to send them ads for baby related products). Id. at 38. Under 
traditional methods of statistical analysis, marketers would first have to specify variables 
that the marketers believed to have predictive import, focusing for example, on women 
within a certain age range, who had purchased items such as pregnancy tests and diapers 
within the past several months. Id. at 39. But by using artificially intelligent predictive 
analytics, the retailer was able to identify previously unknown variables within a sample 
set of customers known to be pregnant (because they had signed up on a baby register), 
thereby improving the store’s ability to predict which customers were pregnant, and 
allowing it to target its marketing campaign more efficiently. Id. 
 170. Id. at 54–59, 116–18; see also Spyros Markridakis, Forecasting the Impact of 
Artificial Intelligence Part 3 of 4: The Potential Effects of AI on Businesses, 
Manufacturing, and Commerce, FORESIGHT: THE INT’L. J. OF APPLIED FORECASTING, 
Spring 2018, at 18. Another important use of predictive analytics is business forecasting, 
whereby analytics are now used to predict such things as a company’s future revenues or 
growth. See generally MICHAEL GILLILAND, LEN TASHMAN & UDO SGLAVO, BUSINESS 
FORECASTING: PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS (2016) (containing a collection of 
leading articles on business forecasting). 
 171. For a graphical overview of these different business uses, see SIEGEL, supra note 
164, at 142 (Tables 1–9).  
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to specify the variables that the researcher believed to be significant for 
purposes of prediction.172 In law, for example, a lawyer may think that 
the court and particular judge involved, the location of the trial, the 
particular lawyers representing the parties, and, of course, the nature of 
the cause(s) of action involved are the most important predictive 
variables. The lawyer can then focus on those variables when comparing 
the facts of precedent cases to the facts of a prospective case. The more 
sophisticated tools that employ artificial intelligence advance the analysis 
further by using algorithms to identify their own predictive variables.173 
Thus, instead of relying just on a researcher’s intuition as to what factors 
have predictive import, some artificially intelligent tools are capable of 
identifying patterns and automatically isolating predictive variables that 
the researcher may not have considered. The tools do this by 
automatically identifying patterns in training sets of data, and then 
creating predictive models based upon these patterns.174 In addition, 
some of the newer tools differ from the earlier, more basic analytics tools 
in that they employ machine-learning techniques, which means that they 
are able to learn from their mistakes, and thereby continue to hone over 
time the accuracy of their predictions.175 If a particular variable turns out 
to be a less promising predictor than originally hypothesized, a 
sophisticated predictive-analytics model will automatically adjust the 
weighting it gives that variable going forward to improve the accuracy of 
the model.176 
Perhaps the most high-profile example in recent years of using 
artificial intelligence to drive more accurate predictions has been the 
development of applications based upon IBM’s Watson platform.177 To 
demonstrate the capability of Watson, IBM first used it to develop an 
artificially intelligent Jeopardy contestant, equipping the computer with 
memory capable of accessing millions of documents very quickly, and 
then training it with appropriate sample sets to predict the correct 
 
 172. See id. at 26–27.  
 173. Id. See generally Lyra Bennett Moss & Janet Chen, Using Big Data for Legal 
and Law Enforcement Decisions: Testing the New Tools, 37 U.N.S.W. L.J. 643 (2014) 
(providing an overview of the process by which artificial intelligence uses algorithms to 
identify predictive variables). 
 174. SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 111–15. 
 175. Id. at 110. 
 176. Id. at 122–23. 
 177. See Katz, supra note 16, at 925–26. 
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answers to Jeopardy questions.178 At first, Watson was unable to beat a 
group of Jeopardy champions. However, because it had machine-learning 
capability, Watson was able to improve its performance as time went on 
to the point where it was able to beat these champions regularly.179 
Subsequently, IBM has used the Watson platform to enable such tools as 
an artificially intelligent chess player180 and an artificially intelligent 
chef,181 both of which are able to compete well with masters of their 
respective crafts. Also, predictive analytics tools are now being used in 
fields like medicine as well, where, among other things, they can help 
predict disease patterns and aid doctors in making diagnoses.182 
As discussed in the following sections, applications based on the 
Watson platform are also now being used, along with other predictive-
analytics tools, to assist the practice of law. 
B. Data Science in the Practice of Law 
In the practice of law, data science has been assuming an 
increasingly important role over the past few years. This began in the 
area of e-discovery, where data science has enabled law firms and 
corporate legal departments to conduct discovery investigations in a 
significantly more cost efficient and timely manner, using techniques 
such as auto classification and predictive coding.183 But data science 
techniques have also been used increasingly for other practice related 
purposes as well, such as: case management, billing, and budgeting; 
records management and other types of information governance; 
contracts review and management; selection of outside counsel; and, 
most pertinent to this article, outcome prediction.184 In addition, legal 
 
 178. See id. at 925–28 (providing a summary of how the Watson platform works). 
 179. See SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 151–52, 178–84. 
 180. See SILVER, supra note 165, at 265–89 (describing the development of IBM’s 
artificially intelligent chess player that is based on the Watson platform, and the 
machine’s ultimate victory over the reigning world champion, Gary Kasparov, in 1997). 
 181. See Alexandra Kleeman, Cooking with Chef Watson, IBM’s Artificial 
Intelligence App, NEW YORKER (Nov. 28, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/11/28/cooking-with-chef-watson-ibms-
artificial-intelligence-app.  
 182. See, e.g., Meisler, supra note 166. 
 183. Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1348 (discussing the enormous growth 
of e-discovery over the past decade).  
 184. Katz, supra note 16, at 928–49 (discussing in detail some of the legal practice 
use of predictive analytics); Warren A. Agin, A Simple Guide to Machine Learning, 
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research services have employed some important data-science advances 
to improve the responsiveness of their searches.185 
The legal profession’s demand for data analytics services appears to 
be growing quickly. For the past several years, an organization called 
The Coalition of Technology Resources for Lawyers (CTRL) has 
published an annual survey of the use of data analytics among corporate 
legal departments in the United States. In the 2015–2016 survey, 93% of 
practitioners reported that they thought data analytics will become more 
important and more widespread in the legal profession in the coming ten 
years, including 31% who predicted that data analytics would be “very 
important,” considered “indispensable,” and its use “widespread” within 
the next ten years.186 One year later, the 2016–2017 survey revealed that 
99% of practitioners now thought that data analytics will be very 
important, considered indispensable, and its use widespread within the 
next decade.187 According to the survey, the principal purposes for which 
corporate legal departments use data analytics at the present time are for 
(1) e-discovery (including document culling, early case assessment, and 
fact-finding), followed by (2) case management (including management 
of outside counsel, comparing projected spending to actual spending, 
resource allocation, and budgeting), (3) review and analysis of 
contracts,188 and (4) information governance (including facilitating 
defensible disposition, facilitating compliance with records policies and 
 
BUSINESS LAW TODAY (Feb. 2017), 
https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2017/02/07_agin.html. 
 185. See, e.g., Robert Ambrogi, Bloomberg Law Launches AI Research Tool to Find 
Key Points of Law, LAWSITES BLOG (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2017/09/bloomberg-law-launches-ai-research-tool-find-
key-points-law.html; see also Ashley & Brüninghaus, supra note 114, at 310–333 
(discussing the use of artificial intelligence in current research platforms and the 
possibilities for further use). 
 186. See COALITION OF TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES FOR LAWYERS, DATA ANALYTICS IN 
THE LEGAL COMMUNITY: 2015–2016 TRENDS 3–6 (2015), http://ctrlinitiative.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/CTRL-Survey-Data-Analytics-in-the-Legal-Community-2015-
2016.pdf.   
 187. See COALITION OF TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES FOR LAWYERS, DATA ANALYTICS IN 
THE LEGAL COMMUNITY: 2016–2017 TRENDS  2–5 (2017), http://ctrlinitiative.com/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/2017-CTRL-Report-R2.pdf [hereinafter CTRL, 2016–2017 
TRENDS]. 
 188. Both Microsoft and Cisco recently announced that they are instigating pilot 
projects to develop and test artificially intelligent software that will help law firms 
manage their contracts. See Rhys Dishpan, Microsoft and Cisco Test the Waters with AI 
Contract Management Pilot Programs, LEGALTECH NEWS (May 15, 2017, 2:38 PM), 
https://www.law.com/legaltechnews/almID/1202786204660/. 
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other requirements, and facilitating data migration).189 Beyond these 
uses, some smaller ventures have been exploring other possible uses for 
predictive analytics in the practice of law. For example, predictive 
analytics can be used to assist lawyers in the jury selection process.190 
Additionally, in the area of criminal law, predictive analytics now offers 
researchers a powerful new tool to assess the potential for recidivism 
among defendants as a routine part of sentencing decisions.191 
Data science, therefore, will undoubtedly play an increasingly 
important role in the practice of law in future years.192 And while 
outcome prediction has not thus far been at the forefront of data science 
applications in the law, that appears to be changing. CTRL’s 2018 
Survey revealed a 43% increase from 2017 in law-firm use of data 
science for purposes of outcome analysis, and a 175% increase (from 
16% to 44% percent of the surveyed firms) in anticipated spending for 
purposes of outcome analysis in the coming year.193 
The following section looks at how lawyers are likely to incorporate 
these predictive analytics tools into their arsenal of traditional predictive 
tools to facilitate more accurate outcome predictions, and it discusses 
some challenges predictive analytics will have to overcome for it to be a 
true game changer. 
C. The Prospects for Using Predictive Analytics to Improve Outcome 
Predictions 
An increasing number of legal commentators have begun to look at 
predictive analytics as a potentially powerful new tool in the area of 
outcome prediction.194 In fact, there is good reason to believe that 
 
 189. See CTRL, 2016–2017 TRENDS, supra note 187, at 1–5. 
 190. See Leslie A. Gordon, Big Data Juries, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2016, at 16. For an 
overview of other law-practice applications of predictive analytics, see Katz, supra note 
16, at 929–36. 
 191. See Richard Berk, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing 
Decision, 27 FED. SENT’G R. 222 (2015). 
 192. Katz, supra note 16, at 963–64. 
 193. See COALITION OF TECHNOLOGY RESOURCES FOR LAWYERS, 2018 ANALYTICS 
REPORT 4–5 (2018), http://ctrlinitiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/2018-CTRL-
IGI-Analytics-Report-Final.pdf. 
 194. See Katz, supra note 16, at 948–49; Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 3 
(“[B]y leveraging the quantitative strength of computers, lawyers can accurately forecast 
how events are likely to play out in the litigation.”); Josh Blackman, The Path of Big 
Data and the Law, in BIG DATA AND THE LAW (West Academic Press 2014); Snyder, 
supra note 33, at 854–66. 
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predictive analytics may well drive some significant changes in the way 
lawyers assess potential case outcomes in their day-to-day practices. 
Thus, in the not-too-distant future, we can expect to see lawyers relying 
heavily on predictive analytics to complement the traditional tools of 
prediction, such as the element-focused analysis. 
This Section looks at the current state of predictive analytics in the 
legal profession, and it assesses the potential going forward for 
predictive analytics to supplant, or more plausibly, complement, the 
traditional tools of outcome prediction discussed above in Part III. First, 
Section V.C.1 looks at the historical development of predictive analytics 
as a tool for making outcome predictions. Next, Section V.C.2 looks at 
the current state of predictive analytics as a tool for assessing outcome 
predictions in the practice of law. Finally, Section V.C.3 examines some 
key challenges predictive analytics will have to overcome going forward 
if it is to have a significant effect on the way lawyers make outcome 
predictions. 
1. The Development of Predictive Analytics as a Tool for 
Outcome Prediction 
Fundamentally, predictive analytics is an extension of the use of 
empirical information, which is one of the traditional tools of outcome 
prediction.195 Like that traditional tool, it helps lawyers predict case 
outcomes by comparing information about past cases with a prospective 
case. Underlying both tools is an assumption (grounded in the concept of 
stare decisis) that similar cases are likely to be decided similarly.196 In 
contrast, whereas the use of jury verdict reporters and settlement data 
rely on the lawyer’s subjective assessment of similarity, predictive 
analytics employs computer algorithms to detect objective patterns in the 
language of court opinions and other court documents that can then be 
compared to the prospective case.197 
For more than half a century now, researchers have been exploring 
the potential use of such computational analyses to predict the outcome 
of legal cases. Most of the early efforts, however, were made in cognate 
fields, such as political science and artificial intelligence.198 And for the 
 
 195. See supra Section III.C. 
 196. See Smith, supra note 42, at 15–16, 55. 
 197. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 16–18. 
 198. See, e.g., Loevinger, supra note 10; Kort, supra note 10; Schubert, supra note 
10; Fisher, supra note 10. 
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most part, these initiatives were not disseminated within the legal 
academy. However, in 1964, a young political science professor named 
Stuart Nagel published an article in the Texas Law Review entitled 
Applying Correlation Analysis to Case Prediction.199 This article 
expanded on an article Nagel had written four years earlier, entitled 
Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Decisions, which was 
published in The American Behavioral Scientist.200 In these articles, 
Nagel used reapportionment cases to demonstrate how “correlation 
analysis” can be used to identify patterns in cases where the party 
attacking apportionment is successful. Nagel then described the process 
for conducting this analysis as follows: 
This process can be partially mechanized by converting the full text of 
the relevant cases into punched tape either by a typist or an optical 
scanner. Which side won in each case as well as the full text should be 
punched on the tape. The punch tape can then be processed by a 
program computer to read out each word (including its grammatical 
variations and synonyms) that has a +20 correlation or more (at a given 
level of probability) with victory for a given side (e.g., the 
apportionment attacker). If too few or too many predictive words are 
read out, the specified correlational probability levels can be raised or 
lowered accordingly. The resulting list of predictive words should 
generate insights as to what some of the relevant predictive variables 
are.201 
Nagel thus set out over 50 years ago, in in a rudimentary form, the 
basic strategy for using predictive analytics to identify patterns in the 
language of case law that can be used to predict case outcomes. 
Over the next several decades, data scientists, political scientists, 
and researchers in the area of artificial intelligence continued to work on 
refining techniques for using computational analyses to predict case 
outcomes (particularly Supreme Court decisions), with limited 
 
 199. Stuart Nagel, Applying Correlation Analysis to Case Prediction, 42 TEX. L. REV. 
1006 (1964) [hereinafter Nagel, Correlation Analysis]. 
 200. Stuart Nagel, Using Simple Calculations to Predict Judicial Decisions, AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST, Dec. 1960, at 24. The most recent formulation of Nagel’s theory can 
be found in his book, COMPUTER-AIDED JUDICIAL ANALYSIS: PREDICTING, PRESCRIBING, 
AND ADMINISTERING (1992). 
 201. Nagel, Correlation Analysis, supra note 199, at 1009. 
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success.202 But the efforts never really generated much interest among 
legal academics until personal computers started becoming ubiquitous in 
the practice of law during the 1990s. 
In 1998, Professor Frederick Schauer wrote an article entitled 
Prediction and Particularity203 that laid an important theoretical 
foundation for predictive analytics. In that article, Schauer discussed the 
role of a legal doctrine in enabling outcome predictions, by contrasting 
the views of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Carl Llewellyn. Under 
Holmes’s view, Schauer argued, a lawyer predicts case outcomes by 
evaluating how courts resolved precedents by reference to traditional 
legal concepts such as “contract,” “consideration,” “waiver,” among 
others. In so doing, the lawyer determines precisely how courts apply 
these legal concepts and compares their applicability to a prospective 
case in order to predict how the prospective case will likely be 
resolved.204 Llewellyn, on the other hand, put a greater emphasis on non-
doctrinal factors in analyzing the likely outcome of cases. As Professor 
Schauer described Llewellyn’s view: 
Llewellyn did not deny that there were regularities in the law. Nor did 
he deny those regularities might facilitate the process of predicting 
future legal outcomes. He did, however, deny that those regularities 
were regularly captured by the generalizations typically referred to as 
“legal doctrine,” and thus claimed that legal doctrine did not reflect 
empirical regularities, and that legal regularities reflected by 
categorizations that did not resemble traditional legal doctrine.205 
Thus, for example, in analyzing injunctions decided by the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals from 1920 to 1954, Holmes would look to 
traditional rules such as “a party who delays claiming its rights to the 
detrimental reliance of another party is precluded from obtaining an 
injunction” in order to predict the likely outcome of a prospective case.206 
Llewellyn, on the other hand, would rely on a non-doctrinal principle 
 
 202. See generally T.W. Rutger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal 
and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision-making, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004). 
 203. Frederick Schauer, Prediction and Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1998) 
[hereinafter Schauer, Prediction and Particularity].  
 204. Id. at 781. 
 205. Id. at 782. 
 206. Id. at 783. 
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such as “the coal company wins” to predict the outcome of future 
cases.207 
Professor Schauer went on to note that, while legal scholars had 
largely ignored Llewellyn’s call to focus on extralegal considerations in 
making outcome predictions, social scientists had been quite active in 
this regard.208 He cited as an example a large body of political science 
scholarship that has analyzed Supreme Court decisions with respect to 
extra-legal variables that enable outcome predictions.209 Schauer 
concluded that while there is slim evidence for the view that traditional 
doctrinal analysis enables accurate outcome predictions, “there is great 
empirical support for what [social scientists] call the ‘attitudinal model,’ 
the view that the best predictors of Supreme Court decisions are the 
policy attitudes or preferences of the justices, and that, often, the best 
predictors of those are the party affiliations of the presidents who 
appointed them.”210 Schauer’s analysis is important, therefore, because it 
emphasizes the importance, for purposes of outcome prediction, of 
looking for meaningful patterns among precedents that go beyond the 
traditional doctrinal concepts the courts purport to rely on in those 
precedents, which is a task for which predictive analytics is well 
suited.211 For even if such factors are deemed to be inappropriate for 
some purposes, such as legal explanations and arguments, their 
predictive value for purposes of outcome prediction should not be 
disregarded. 
2. The Current Status of Predictive Analytics as a Tool for 
Outcome Prediction 
Over the past several years, legal scholars have begun to take an 
increasing interest in the topic of prediction in the law, particularly the 
prospects for using data science to enable more accurate outcome 
predictions. Among the more prominent voices in the field at present 
 
 207. See id. at 783–84. 
 208. Id. at 784–85. 
 209. Id. at 784 n.31; see also Katz, supra note 16, at 936–39 (discussing social 
science research beginning in the 1980s that focuses on using non-doctrinal 
considerations to inform outcome prediction in the context of Supreme Court cases); 
Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1352 n.62 (summarizing research on data-driven 
attempts to predict Supreme Court decisions).  
 210. See Schauer, Prediction and Particularity supra note 203, at 784–85. 
 211. See Bennett & Chen, supra note 173, at 647–650 (describing how predictive 
analytics goes beyond traditional legal concepts in employing predictive variables). 
OSBECK- FINAL EDITED (DO NOT DELETE) 12/10/2018  4:54 PM 
92 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 123:1 
 
 
 
 
time is Professor Daniel Katz, whose important paper, Quantitative 
Legal Prediction – or – How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Start 
Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry,212 
provides a summary of the current uses of data analytics in the practice 
of law, including outcome prediction. With respect to outcome 
prediction, the piece examines the early efforts to employ machine 
learning to enable outcome predictions, particularly in the fields of patent 
law and securities fraud class actions. Katz stresses the preliminary 
nature of these efforts and argues that predictive analytics will soon be 
employed widely to assist lawyers in making outcome predictions.213 He 
concludes that “the age of quantitative legal predictions is about a 
mixture of humans or machines working together to outperform either 
working in isolation.”214 
The study of predictive analytics to assess potential case outcomes 
has also led to the development of products that can be used to aid 
outcome prediction. The principal commercial online research services 
began offering tools for evaluating potential case outcomes several years 
ago. These tools essentially aggregated data from jury verdict reports and 
related publications, allowing users to filter results by category such as 
type of case, lawyer, judge, and location to find comparable cases. 
LexisNexis, for example, introduced a product called Verdict & 
Settlement Analyzer,215 and Westlaw introduced a product called Case 
Evaluator.216 Both provide information about verdicts (and some 
settlements) for particular causes of action in various jurisdictions, 
showing averages and ranges of recovery for a variety of different types 
of cases. They break the information down by jurisdiction and court, by 
party (plaintiff versus defendant), by subject matter, and by amount of 
verdict, and they provide case summaries, along with trial and appellate 
documents that were filed in the actions. These tools have brought a 
greater degree of precision to the process of comparing and analyzing 
 
 212. Daniel Martin Katz, Quantitative Legal Prediction – Or – How I Learned to Stop 
Worrying and Start Preparing for the Data-Driven Future of the Legal Services Industry, 
62 EMORY L.J. 909 (2013). 
 213. Id. at 936–942. 
 214. Id. at 929. 
 215. See LexisNexis Verdict & Settlement Analyzer, LEXISNEXIS, 
https://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/verdict-and-settlement-analyzer.page (last 
visited July 30, 2018). 
 216. See Westlaw Case Evaluator, THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL SOLUTIONS, 
https://tmsnrt.rs/2LQzDN8 (last visited July 30, 2018). 
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past cases that are similar (per various metrics that the user can specify) 
to the case in question. Instead of just perusing summaries of cases in 
jury verdict reporters and looking for similarities to the case in question, 
the lawyer can rely on data automatically compiled from such cases by 
the search engine.217 
In addition, somewhat more sophisticated tools that incorporate 
artificial intelligence and machine-learning techniques have been 
introduced in recent years by smaller commercial ventures (mostly 
incubated by universities) to assist lawyers in evaluating cases. The 
pioneer in this area of predictive analytics has been a company called 
Lex Machina, which is now owned by LexisNexis.218 Based in Silicon 
Valley, Lex Machina began as a public interest project at Stanford 
University, and was a spin-off from the law school and the Computer 
Science Department.219 The company focused on two areas of law: patent 
litigation (its original focus) and securities litigation, though it now 
provides some analytic services with respect to other types of cases as 
well, such as antitrust, employment, and products liability cases.220 The 
company uses predictive analytics tools to provide insights on opposing 
lawyers, law firms, parties, judges, venues, and other information, and it 
offers individualized early case assessment.221 On the patent litigation 
side, it has compiled a huge database of information from the Electronic 
Document Information System of the United States International Trade 
Commission, as well as from the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office, including documents from trials before the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board. It then supplements this information with trial-court 
documents from the federal government’s PACER service.222 On the 
 
 217. Some jury verdict reporters now offer these tools as well, as noted above. See 
supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
 218. See Casey Sullivan, LexisNexis Acquires Lex Machina, BIG LAW BUSINESS (Nov. 
23, 2015), https://bit.ly/2KyJBSB. 
 219. See About Lex Machina, LEX MACHINA, https://bit.ly/2IEPSXT (last visited Aug. 
1, 2018). 
 220. See About LexisNexis, LEXISNEXIS, https://bit.ly/2MGtgc2 (last visited Aug. 1, 
2018). 
 221. See Legal Analytics Platform, LEX MACHINA, https://lexmachina.com/legal-
analytics/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018); Legal Analytics Apps, LEX MACHINA, 
https://lexmachina.com/legal-analytics-apps/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
 222. See How It Works, LEX MACHINA, https://bit.ly/2yYNPOJ (last visited Aug. 1, 
2018). 
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securities side, the company analyzes data regarding damages from 
reports of SEC penalties, discouragements, and approved settlements.223 
With respect to outcome prediction, Lex Machina’s Case Resolution 
Analytics tool tracks different variables and case outcomes to enable 
more accurate predictions. Other tools provide information on trends in 
holdings among judges and courts, evaluations of opposing counsel 
parties, information on a party’s litigation history, and damages 
analytics. A fairly new product is the company’s Motion Kickstarter tool, 
which assists lawyers in drafting motions by identifying which 
arguments and motion styles are likely to be the most successful in a 
certain type of case, taking into account the particular court or judge. 
While Lex Machina was the first significant venture to make 
predictive analytics available to lawyers, it has now been joined by 
several other significant ventures. These include Bloomberg Law, which 
introduced its Litigation Analytics tool in 2016,224 Judicial Perspectives 
(which is owned by ALM),225 Premonition (which is based on IBM’s 
Watson platform and focuses on lawyer selection analytics),226 and Ravel 
Law.227 Of these, Ravel Law appears to be making the biggest splash. 
Ravel Law, like Lex Machina, is a 2012 spinoff from Stanford 
University’s law, computer science, and “d.school” departments.228 Also 
like Lex Machina, Ravel Law is now owned by LexisNexis and available 
as part of Lexis’s subscription package.229 The program is best known for 
its innovative legal research platform, which uses visualization tools to 
 
 223. Another venture that provides analytics services in the area of securities 
litigation is NERA Economic Consulting. See NERA, http://www.nera.com (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2018). 
 224. See Litigation Analytics, BLOOMBERG LAW, https://bit.ly/2KkXjsO (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2018); see also Robert Ambrogi, Bloomberg Law’s New Litigation Analytics 
Peeks Under the Robes of Judicial Data, LAWSITES BLOG (Oct. 19, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2MCTMTl (discussing how Bloomberg Law’s Litigation Analytics tool 
“aims to help attorneys gain insights into questions such as how long federal judges 
typically take to resolve cases, how they rule on dispositive motions, and how often they 
are overturned on appeal.”). 
 225. See Legal Solutions to Build a Better Case, ALM INTELLIGENCE, 
https://bit.ly/2yXmtsr (last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
 226. See Legal Analytics, PREMONITION, https://bit.ly/2z0jMX0 (last visited Aug. 1, 
2018). 
 227. See Our Products, RAVEL LAW, http://ravellaw.com/products/ (last visited Aug. 
1, 2018). 
 228. See Who We Are, RAVEL LAW, http://ravellaw.com/who-we-are/ (last visited 
Aug. 1, 2018). 
 229. See Stephen Rynkiewicz, LexisNexis Acquires Case Analytics Firm Ravel Law, 
A.B.A. J. DAILY NEWS (June 8, 2017, 2:49 PM), https://bit.ly/2KwvWvc. 
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show users at a glance the complex relationships between the various 
precedents interpreting a particular rule.230 But Ravel Law has also 
moved in the past two years into the business of predictive analytics. Its 
Court Analytics and Judge Analytics tools analyze for a particular judge 
or court, or by jurisdiction, case outcomes, language patterns, and 
citation history to provide insight on past rulings and to shed light on 
anticipated future case outcomes.231 The tools are thus valuable both for 
outcome predictions, as well for crafting persuasive arguments. In 
addition, Ravel Law has introduced a tool called Firm Analytics that 
tracks, for various legal specialties, the success rates and volume of work 
of various large law firms in order to assist consumers of legal services 
in choosing the best firm for a particular job.232 LexisNexis is currently 
in the process of rolling many of these tools into its Lexis Advance 
platform.233 
Another venture that has drawn significant attention is ROSS 
Intelligence. Incubated at the University of Toronto, ROSS Intelligence 
is now located in Silicon Valley.234 The company is primarily associated 
with legal research; it is based on IBM’s Watson platform and relies 
upon artificial intelligence and machine learning tools. 235 ROSS 
Intelligence touts its product as the “world’s first digital lawyer” because 
it allows lawyers using it to ask natural language questions, to which it 
provides answers by predicting the most applicable solution to the 
problem posed by the question.236 Earlier this year, ROSS also 
 
 230. Ravel Law has also drawn significant attention for its Case Law Access Project, 
which has digitized and provided open access to all the case law in the Harvard Law 
School library. See Case Law Access Project, LIBRARY INNOVATION LAB, 
https://lil.law.harvard.edu/projects/caselaw-access-project/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018). 
 231. See Our Products, RAVEL LAW, http://ravellaw.com/products/ (last visited Aug. 
1, 2018). 
 232. See Daniel Lewis, Introducing Firm Analytics, RAVEL LAW (May 23, 2017), 
http://ravellaw.com/introducing-firm-analytics/.   
 233. See Robert Ambrogi, Exclusive First Look: Ravel Law’s Integration with Lexis 
Advance, LAWSITES BLOG (Feb. 2, 2018), https://bit.ly/2z0m4FB. 
 234. See AL Interview: Andrew Arruda, CEO and Co-Founder, ROSS Intelligence, 
ARTIFICIAL LAWYER (Oct. 12, 2016), https://bit.ly/2ILJttQ. 
 235. See id. Westlaw has recently introduced a similar tool, called Westlaw Answers, 
as has LexisNexis, which recently introduced Lexis Answers. Both provide ordinary 
language answers to common legal inquiries. See Westlaw Recent Enhancements, 
THOMSON REUTERS LEGAL SOLUTIONS, https://tmsnrt.rs/2z2FMR8 (last visited Aug. 1, 
2018); You Ask. Lexis Answers—new machine-learning feature on Lexis Advance, 
LEXISNEXIS, https://bit.ly/2v7co7C (last visited Aug. 1, 2018).  
 236. See ROSS Intelligence: Overview, LINKEDIN, 
https://www.linkedin.com/company/ross-inc/ (last visited Aug. 1, 2018); see also KEVIN 
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introduced a free product called EVA that analyzes drafts of legal briefs 
to ensure that the citations are still good law and to locate additional 
cases with similar language to those in the brief.237 While ROSS 
currently does not provide a tool for making outcome predictions (given 
that it is not equipped to handle questions such as, “[w]hat is the 
likelihood that my client wins this case, given the following facts?”), it 
does not seem far-fetched to think that the product could eventually be 
enabled to make such predictions.238 
In sum, while the available predictive-analytics technology is not 
yet at a state where it can enable accurate outcome predictions over a 
broad variety of case types, the landscape is evolving quickly, and it 
would seem reasonable, based upon the trajectory of growth in the field, 
to envision that these tools will be widely used by practitioners to 
supplement the traditional tools of outcome prediction in the not-too-
distant future. For this vision to be realized, however, data scientists will 
need to overcome the obstacles discussed in Section V.C.3 below. 
3. Potential Limitations on the Use of Predictive Analytics as a 
Tool for Outcome Prediction 
While the future of predictive analytics in the legal profession looks 
bright, it is important to keep in mind some of the potential limitations on 
its ability to improve outcome predictions. While the technological 
advances hold significant potential, it is easy to get caught up in the 
enthusiasm and lose track of their limitations. As Nate Silver emphasized 
in his book on predictive analytics, The Signal and the Noise—Why So 
Many Predictions Fail, But Some Don’t, “[I]f science and technology are 
the heroes of this book, there is risk in the age of Big Data about 
becoming too starry-eyed about what they might accomplish.”239 So 
while predictive analytics has some advantages over the traditional tools 
of outcome prediction, particularly the element-focused analysis 
discussed in Parts III and IV, it is premature to say that it will replace 
 
D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS 14–18 (explaining 
generally how Watson works). 
 237.  See Robert Ambrogi, ROSS Unveils EVA, a Free AI Tool to Analyze Briefs, 
Check Cites and Find Similar Cases, LAWSITES BLOG (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2EmP1L2. 
 238. But see ASHLEY, supra note 236, at 18–31 (discussing the challenges Watson 
faces in terms of its ability to engage in “legal reasoning” and solve legal problems). 
 239. SILVER, supra note 165, at 447. 
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these traditional tools in the near future; rather, predictive analytics can 
be expected to complement the traditional tools of outcome prediction. 
On the plus side, predictive analytics is not subject to some of the 
problems with the traditional tools discussed in Part IV above. The 
difficulty in assessing probabilities that afflict the element-focused 
analysis, for example, is not an issue because predictive analytics does 
not rely on an analysis of independent variables,240 relying instead on the 
detection of subtle correlations to enable predictions. Likewise, 
predictive analytics is better able to account for extra-legal 
considerations than the traditional tools because it can look for patterns 
among the holdings of individual judges, courts, and party types based 
on factors the courts may not have enunciated in the opinions (e.g., it can 
quantify the percentage of time the coal company actually does win in 
injunction cases).241 And the data set on which the analysis is based 
could be significantly broader than the limited collection of precedents a 
lawyer uses in an element-focused analysis because predictive analytics 
could take into account trial documents and other information about a 
case beyond mere published opinions.242 Nevertheless, as discussed 
further below, the availability of meaningful data is not as 
comprehensive as one would hope. 
According to Nate Silver, a lack of meaningful data is one of the 
two principal factors that limits the success of predictive analytics 
generally.243 The other is the difficulty in separating what he calls the 
“noise” from the “signal.” As Silver put it: 
The goal of any predictive model is to capture as much signal as 
possible and as little noise as possible. Striking the right balance is not 
always so easy, and our ability to do so will be dictated by the strength 
of the theory and the quality and quantity of the data.244 
 
 240. See supra notes 132–142 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Ashley & Brüninghaus, supra note 114, at 317–318 (discussing research 
showing that predictive analytics can make accurate predictions based on rules that do 
not correspond to patterns of reasoning that are familiar to lawyers). 
 242. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1354–1368 (discussing sources of 
potentially useful data); see also Kevin W. Clement & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation 
Realities, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 119, 125–126 (2002) (“On the one hand, judicial decisions 
represent only the very tip of the mass of grievances. . . . On the other hand, published 
decisions are a skewed sample of that tip . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 243. See SILVER, supra note 165, at 80. 
 244. Id. at 388. 
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This difficulty in teasing out the signal from the noise is the central 
metaphor that runs throughout Silver’s book. What he seems to be 
referring to is the unique feature of predictive analytics that is both a 
strength and a weakness. Because it does not try to tease out causal 
factors for purposes of explanation, but merely looks to find predictive 
patterns, predictive analytics is able to identify a broader array of 
meaningful (for purposes of prediction but not necessarily explanation) 
correlations than traditional scientific methods.245 
To use a simple example, predictive analytics may reveal that 
persons living in a certain geographic area tend to be afflicted with lung 
cancer at a higher rate than average. But this correlation does not show 
that living in the locale is itself the cause of lung cancer—it may just be 
that persons living in that locality smoke at a higher rate than average. 
But for purposes of prediction (e.g., for healthcare planning purposes), 
that distinction doesn’t really matter. 
This strength, however, can also be a weakness. Because it does not 
deal in the realm of causation, predictive analytics is subject to 
identifying accidental correlations that are not meaningful and do not 
inform predictions.246 The key challenge for predictive analytics is thus 
to find ways to eliminate statistical anomalies (i.e., randomness) that do  
not enable accurate predictions, and in fact, impede them. As Silver put 
it: 
It would be nice if we could just plug data into a statistical model, 
crunch the numbers, and take for granted that it was a good 
representation of the real world. Under some conditions, especially in a 
data-rich fields like baseball, that assumption is fairly close to being 
 
 245. SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 90 (“When applying PA, we usually don’t know 
about causation, and we often don’t necessarily care. For many PA projects, the objective 
is more to predict than it is to understand the world and figure out what makes it tick.”); 
see also Katz, supra note 16, at 952. Of course, the use of predictive analytics is not 
limited to finding these types of “black box” correlations. Predictive analytics can also be 
used to help lawyers craft effective arguments by identifying legal arguments, phrases, or 
cases that have proven to be particularly persuasive, either in general, or with respect to a 
particular judge. Ravel Law, for example, touts its Court Analytics and Judge Analytics 
tools for this purpose. See Our Products, RAVEL LAW, http://ravellaw.com/products/ (last 
visited Aug. 1, 2018).  
 246. See SIEGEL, supra note 164, at 121 (“For any predictive model a pressing 
question persists: Has it learned something true that holds in general, or only discovered 
patterns that hold within this data set?”).  
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correct. In many other cases, a failure to think carefully about causality 
will lead us up blind alleys.247 
Thus, predictive analytics is still a work in progress, and significant work 
remains to be done to improve its ability to distinguish meaningful (i.e., 
predictive) patterns from non-meaningful patterns.248 
Furthermore, the use of predictive analytics to inform outcome 
predictions in the law also suffers from the other significant challenge 
that Silver referenced (i.e., a lack of quality data). The world of judicial 
decision-making is not the world of baseball, where “pretty much 
everything that has happened on a major-league playing field in the past 
140 years has been dutifully and accurately recorded, and hundreds of 
players play in the big leagues every year.”249 Rather, as discussed above 
in Section IV.A, there are some significant limitations on the types of 
information available with respect to the actual bases for judge and jury 
decisions. This is perhaps particularly apparent with respect to settlement 
information, where the lack of widely available data concerning 
confidential settlements poses a significant challenge for lawyers using 
predictive analytics to inform outcome predictions. The problem is that 
most litigation matters are resolved through settlement, and most of the 
litigation matters that are resolved through settlement rely on 
confidentiality clauses to limit public access to the terms of the 
settlement.250 But unless data analytics companies can tap into such 
information, their predictions will not be highly accurate, given the 
limited data sets that they are able to draw from with respect to case 
outcomes. To be sure, there are some types of litigation where settlement 
data is more widely available, such as securities class-action litigation, in 
which many settlements require court approval, and are therefore in the 
public domain. Thus, it is not surprising that companies like Lex 
Machina have so far focused on specialty areas, such as securities 
litigation and intellectual property litigation. However, this is the 
exception, not the rule; for most litigation matters, information about 
 
 247. SILVER, supra note 165, at 372. 
 248. For a detailed discussion of the various techniques AI researchers have 
employed in their effort to improve outcome predictions, see ASHLEY, supra note 236, at 
107–126. 
 249. SILVER, supra note 165, at 80. 
 250. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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settlement amounts remains largely outside the reach of lawyers not 
privy to the case.251 
Of course, much of this data is out there; the challenge is to make it 
readily available to lawyers for purposes of outcome prediction. 
Currently, insurance companies and other corporations that are involved 
in frequent litigation compile settlement data for their own use, and this 
gives them a significant advantage in predicting how litigation matters 
are likely to be resolved. But most lawyers do not have access to this 
type of information, and they are thus left to draw primarily on the 
traditional outcome prediction tools discussed in Parts III and IV above. 
If, going forward, insurers and other companies with large quantities of 
settlement data would agree to pool such data and make it publicly 
available (perhaps for a fee), that would go a long way toward enabling 
predictive analytics to provide reasonable assessments of litigation 
prospects in prospective cases. However, there is no indication at present 
to think that such companies plan to do so.252 
A further limitation on the quality of data that predictive analytics 
relies on is its generic nature, which makes it difficult to track individual 
factual distinctions between cases. Just evaluating the data from 
published opinions does not provide a lot of information about the facts 
that may have weighed on a court’s decision in a precedent beyond what 
the court specifically identifies as legally relevant.253 Without reference 
to the entire factual record in a case, predictive analytics will be limited 
in its ability to find meaningful factual similarities between past cases 
and a prospective case, thus limiting its predictive potential. To be sure, 
including pleadings and other trial documents that contain factual 
information in the data set can help significantly in this respect, which is 
presumably why a company such as Lex Machina includes trial-level 
 
 251. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 252. An argument can be made that insurers and other companies with large amounts 
of compiled settlement data would be doing everyone a favor, including themselves, were 
they to make their settlement information more widely available. As discussed in the 
previous section, there is a tendency for lawyers to overestimate the likelihood of their 
being successful in a given action that can skew accurate outcome predictions. If these 
lawyers were privy to more actual data about the types of cases they were involved in, 
they might be able to temper their expectations, which would lead to earlier and more 
efficient settlements. See Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1374–1377 (discussing 
research that indicates parties are more likely to settle if each side has better information 
about its opponent’s case). 
 253. For a helpful overview of the prospects for using predictive analytics to assess 
legal relevance, see Katz, supra note 16, at 954–57. 
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documents (such as those available on the PACER database) in its 
analysis.254 But even with such trial documents, factual information is 
limited because some of the documents that would be the most data-rich, 
such as deposition transcripts, are generally not publicly available. This 
lack of factual information is particularly acute with respect to non-
doctrinal considerations that may affect the outcome of a case. The 
likability and credibility of the individual parties, for example, are widely 
recognized as factors affecting the outcome of trials.255 Yet this not the 
kind of information that generally gets compiled in court documents, 
particularly with respect to jury trials. 
In sum, the use of data analytics to predict legal outcomes is not 
likely to be a cure-all for the problems associated with the traditional 
predictive tools. But it may well provide a useful supplemental tool in 
the not-too-distant future to augment the type of predictive analysis 
undertaken in the traditional legal memorandum. And as Professor Katz 
argues,256 predictive analytics tools used in conjunction with the 
traditional predictive tools will likely outperform either type of tool used 
individually. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Outcome prediction has always been a vital part of practicing law. 
Clients of all types rely on their attorneys to provide accurate 
assessments of the potential legal consequences the clients face when 
making important decisions. And yet, notwithstanding its enormous 
importance to the practice of law, outcome prediction in the law remains 
a very imprecise endeavor. The three traditional tools lawyers rely on 
when making predictions, the element-focused analysis, lawyerly 
experience, and empirical information, are all subject to significant 
limitations that hinder their effectiveness as predictive tools. 
Fortunately, however, recent advances in data science are enabling 
new predictive tools that look to be potential game-changers. Already, 
these advances are bringing about significant changes in the way lawyers 
practice law, and they hold significant promise for outcome prediction as 
well. Thus, it seems quite likely that predictive analytics, while not a 
 
 254. For helpful discussion of PACER as a source of litigation data at the trial level, 
see Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 22, at 1357–1364. 
 255. MAUET & MARCUS, supra note 17, at 405–406. 
 256. Katz, supra note 16, at 929 (“The equation is simple: Humans + Machines ˃ 
Humans or Machines.”). 
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panacea that can replace the traditional tools of outcome prediction in the 
foreseeable future, will increasingly emerge as an important 
supplemental tool that should help to make outcome predictions more 
accurate. And that is very good news for the clients who rely on the 
predictions. 
 
